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Abstract
This study examines price setting behaviour of Italian firms on the basis of the results
of a survey conducted by Banca d’Italia in early 2003 on a sample of around 350 firms
belonging to all economic sectors. Prices are mostly fixed following standard mark-up rules,
although customer-specific characteristics have a role, in particular in manufacturing and
services where price discrimination across customers matters. Rival prices mostly affect
price-setting strategies in industrial firms. In reviewing their prices, firms follow either state-
dependent rules or a combination of time and state-dependent ones. Concerning the
frequency of price adjustments, a considerable degree of stickiness emerges both at the stage
in which firms evaluate their pricing strategies and the stage in which they actually
implement the price change. In 2002 most firms changed their price only once. Three
alternative explanations of nominal rigidity are ranked highest by the firms interviewed:
explicit contracts, tacit collusive behaviour and the perception of the temporary nature of the
shock. Prices respond asymmetrically to shocks, depending on the direction of the
adjustment (positive vs negative) and the source of the shock (demand vs supply). Real
rigidities – captured by the degree of market competition, customers’ search costs, the
sensitivity of profits to changes in demand – play an important role in determining this
asymmetry. Moreover, whereas cost shocks impact more when prices have to be raised than
when they have to be reduced, demand decreases are more likely to induce a price change
than demand increases.
Keywords: nominal rigidity, real rigidity, price-setting, inflation persistence, survey data.
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1
The behaviour of prices, and in particular the issue of nominal price stickiness and its
implications for the conduct of monetary policy, has a long and consolidated theoretical
tradition.
2 Due to the scarcity of available data, however, the number of empirical studies of
firms’ pricing behaviour is quite small and most of them typically refer to price-setting by a
single firm or in a single market (Cecchetti, 1986; Kayshap, 1995). Recent analyses have
examined price behaviour in a number of European countries on the basis of sectoral
consumer price indices (Hall and Yates, 1997, 2000; Yates, 1998; Aucremanne et al., 2002;
Suvanto and Hukkinen, 2002; Fabiani et al., 2003), while evidence based on micro consumer
price data (elementary price quotes) mostly refers to the US (see for example Bils and
Klenow, 2002).
3
In this paper we follow a different approach, initiated by the work of Blinder (1994),
Blinder  et al. (1998) for the US and of Hall et al. (2000) for the UK, which relies on
information collected directly from firms.
4 Our analysis investigates a number of aspects of
pricing behaviour in Italy on the basis of the questionnaire responses of a sample of around
350 industrial and service firms at the beginning of 2003. Our aim is to gather some
evidence of how firms set their prices, how often and why they change (or do not change)
them. In particular, we are interested in evaluating the extent of price stickiness across firms
with different characteristics and across economic sectors and, in particular, in analysing the
main explanatory factors.
5
                                                
1  This study has been conducted in the context of the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network (IPN).
We are indebted to an anonymous referee and to all participants to the IPN for their useful comments; we are
also grateful to Luigi Guiso, Marco Magnani and Ivan Faiella for their comments on a preliminary version of
the paper. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those
of the Bank of Italy.
2 For a survey, see Taylor (1999).
3  For a summary of the main findings of the empirical literature, both for Italy and for other European
countries and the US, see Fabiani et al. (2003).
4  The survey approach was also adopted by Koehler (1996) and Apel et al. (2001), who analysed survey
evidence respectively for Germany and Sweden.
5  Clearly, the use of survey data is subject to a few caveats: the uncertain quality of the answers provided
by firms regarding one of their most strategic variables (prices), which is difficult to assess; and the absence of
the time dimension, which implies that results can be affected in an unpredictable way by the peculiarity of the10
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the sample of firms
interviewed and the structure of the questionnaire. Section 3 focuses on the main
characteristics of each firm’s reference market and its relationships with its customers.
Section 4 addresses the issue of how the firm sets its price. Section 5 explores how rigid this
price is, when and how it changes, and what are the main factors underlying its stickiness.
The reaction of prices to demand and cost shocks is investigated in Section 6, which also
presents an empirical exercise designed to detect and explain any asymmetries in price
adjustment. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
2. The survey
The survey was carried out by a private company in January 2003 (see Appendix B for
details) using a questionnaire and a sample of firms provided by the Bank of Italy.
6
The population from which the sample was drawn consists of firms with more than 50
employees, belonging to all sectors excluding the public sector, agriculture, banking,
insurance, transport and housing services and a small number of other service branches, as
the questionnaire was not suitable for firms belonging to such sectors, in particular because
of the difficulty related to the identification of the main product.
7
The population was stratified according to size and geographical area but not with
respect to the sector of activity, in order to avoid cells with too few observations.
Of the 700 or so industrial and service firms with more than 50 employees sampled
according to the above procedure, 333 agreed to participate in the survey and completed the
questionnaire (see Table 1 in Appendix B). The response rate (around 50 per cent) was
                                                                                                                                            
period in which the survey is carried out. These aspects notwithstanding, the “qualitative” information collected
by interviewing firms about their pricing strategies highlights important aspects which could not be assessed
otherwise and which are complementary to those that can be investigated using either micro or aggregate data.
6  The sample was drawn from a larger one, currently used for the Bank of Italy quarterly survey of
inflation expectations. In order to test whether firms were able to provide suitable answers to all questions, the
questionnaire was pre-tested on a pilot sample of around 20 firms; on the basis of their answers a few minor
changes were introduced.
7  This selection was partly the results of the pilot survey.11
acceptable given the complexity of the actual questionnaire; the rate is in fact only slightly
lower than in the analysis by Blinder et al. (1998) and Hall et al. (2000).
Table 1 reports the classification of the 333 respondents by economic activity: around
2/3 of them belong to the industrial sector, the remaining ones to the service sector. The
latter’s under-representation is due both to the fact, as mentioned above, that we had to
exclude a priori a few branches and to the lower response rate among service firms (37.1
and 40.2 per cent in retail and other services, respectively) than manufacturing ones (48.5
per cent). The highest rate of response was recorded in the food industry (68.8 per cent).
Differences in the response rate by firm size and geographical area were more limited.





Industry excluding construction 423 215 50.8
of which:  Manufacturing excl. food 375 182 48.5
                    Food 48 33 68.8
Construction 13 4 30.8
Retail 124 46 37.1
Other services 169 68 40.2
Size
Up to 199 employees 259 129 49.8
200-999 employees 335 140 41.8
> 999 employees 135 64 47.4
Geographical area
North-west 309 133 43.0
North-east 175 88 50.3
Centre 131 62 47.3
South-islands 114 50 43.9
Total 729 333 45.7
Firms were allowed to answer either by compiling the questionnaire in an electronic
format on the Internet or by replying by fax. The use of the Internet facilitated and speeded
up the whole procedure, and also helped to contain the cost of the survey.
8
The questions were mostly multiple-choice. In some cases the possible answers were
coded on a 4-point scale (1=unimportant; 2=minor importance; 3=important; 4=very
                                                
8 The use of the Internet was motivated by the fact that the survey was outsourced to the same company
that has been carrying out over the last few years the quarterly Bank of Italy survey of inflation expectations.
Moreover, the same sample of firms was used. The above survey is regularly conducted through the Internet,
though firms can also use the fax to send their answers. The percentage of firms which have preferred to rely on12
important). Since in a few questions the possible answers were not mutually exclusive, we
left some flexibility by allowing firms to choose more than one answer. In some cases we
also left "open-answers", which could be used by respondents to express their views in their
own words. A small number of questions required a precise quantitative answer.
On the basis of the stratification criteria described above, the answers provided by each
firm were weighted with the ratio between the number of firms in the population belonging
to each cell and the number of respondents in the same cell. All results presented in the
remainder of this paper are hence analysed and reported as estimated proportions of the
population, as they are based on this weighting scheme (see Appendix B for details). For
most answers, results are presented both for the total sample and with a sectoral breakdown,
in order to investigate eventual differences in pricing behaviour across industries. The
significance of such differences is computed on the basis of standard statistical tests and
discussed, where deemed necessary, in the text (for the significance tests see the tables
reported in the Appendix C).
The questionnaire draws upon those developed by Blinder at al. (1998) for the US and
by Hall et al. (1997, 2000) for the UK.
9 It is organised in four sections (the complete
questionnaire is presented in Appendix A). The first collects general information on the
market in which the firm operates and some features of its relationship with its customers.
The second section focuses on the price-setting mechanism and in particular on the
determinants of the price level. The third section deals with the main aspects underlying
price reviews and price changes. The final part of the questionnaire tries to assess whether
firms facing different kinds of shocks behave asymmetrically when the price has to be
increased or decreased.
The survey refers to the firms’ “main product (or service)”, defined as the one that
generated the highest turnover in 2002. Since for around 74 per cent of the responding firms
                                                                                                                                            
the Internet has increased over time, up to around 90 per cent in the last two years. Firms report to be quite
pleased with the use of the Internet and there is no evidence that the response rate is affected by that.
9  The empirical analysis by Blinder et al. (1998) is based on a sample of around 200 private firms, which
were interviewed face-to-face by graduate students between April 1990 and March 1992; for the initial random
sample, the response rate was around 60 per cent. The survey conducted by the Bank of England (Hall et al.,
1997, 2000) is based on a much larger sample, since 1100 firms were initially approached (interviews were13
it accounts for more than 40 per cent of turnover (Table 2), the decision to focus on pricing
strategies for the main product does not seem to be over restrictive.
Table 2 - What is the percentage turnover from your
“main product”?










(1) Firms which did not provide an answer.
3. Market structure and firm-customer relationships
Turning to the firm’s market (i.e. the market in which it sells its main product), we first
enquired whether it is mainly the domestic market (national or local) or a foreign one
(questions A4-A5). This is an important piece of information as pricing policies might differ
in the two cases. The domestic is the main market for around 80 per cent of the firms. Only
in the manufacturing sector did a large proportion of respondents (around 25 per cent)
indicated foreign markets as most important for sales of their main product (Table 3). On the
domestic market, firms belonging to manufacturing, construction and food industries mostly
conduct business at the national level; conversely, the local market is particularly important
in the retail sector (60.7 per cent). Such differences, in particular between manufacturing and
the other sectors, are confirmed as being statistically significant by the formal tests described
in the previous section and reported in Table C3 in Appendix C).
                                                                                                                                            
conducted in September 1995) and 654 provided usable answers; the sample is biased towards large companies,14
Table 3 – What is the most important market (in terms of turnover) for your “main product”?






Total 25.4 55.0 9.3 7.1 3.2 100
Manufacturing excl. food 10.8 58.5 15.4 9.8 5.5 100
Food 31.3 55.7 6.4 5.9 0.7 100
Construction 36.5 63.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 100
Retail 60.7 36.1 0.0 2.9 0.3 100
Other services 36.1 59.4 1.0 3.5 0.0 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C. 
(1) Firms which did not provide an answer.
The strategic interaction between firms competing on the same market is clearly a
crucial variable in price-setting behaviour. In principle, the higher the degree of competition
the more the firm’s pricing strategy is likely to be affected by the behaviour of its
competitors. In particular, we expect firms in highly competitive markets to revise their
prices more frequently since, as suggested by Hall et al. (1997), setting the wrong price has
more serious consequences.
We tried to capture the role played by competitive pressures by asking firms to provide
information on their market share (question A6) and on the number of their competitors
(question A7), both referring to the relevant market for the main product.
In general, the firms interviewed seem to be “big players”. Overall, only around 19 per
cent of them are not among the first 10 companies on the relevant market (Table 4); 11.6 per
cent reported themselves as being the first firm, 30.7 per cent as being among the first 4.
This is not surprising, given that the survey covers only firms with more than 50 employees
and, in particular, that firms are asked to focus on a very narrowly-defined category of goods
or services. This could partly explain why the degree of market power, as captured by the
above indicator, is higher for manufacturing and retail firms than for service ones.
This picture is broadly confirmed by the information concerning the number of
competitors.
10 Around 17 per cent of the sample reported having less than 5 rivals (Table 5).
This share is much higher in other services (26.6 per cent).
                                                                                                                                            
mostly belonging to the manufacturing sector (68 per cent of the total).
10 A simple correlation analysis, provided by questions A6 and A7, to test the robustness of the
information on the degree of competition showed a positive and quite high correlation between the two.15












Total 11.6 30.7 23.5 18.6 15.6 100
Manufacturing excl. food 11.8 36.8 20.6 15.9 14.9 100
    Up to 199 employees 9.0 36.0 20.8 17.2 17.0 100
    200-999 employees 23.7 42.6 20.0 9.6 4.1 100
    > 999 employees 42.9 30.9 17.2 5.5 3.5 100
Food 12.7 21.6 23.3 24.9 17.5 100
    Up to 199 employees 13.4 16.9 24.9 25.4 19.4 100
    200-999 employees 7.2 61.2 9.7 21.9 0.0 100
    >999 employees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100
Construction 0.0 3.2 0.0 96.8 0.0 100
    Up to 199 employees 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100
    200-999 employees 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100
    >999 employees 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100
Retail 19.0 28.5 23.8 7.7 21.0 100
    Up to 199 employees 19.6 28.1 23.1 8.1 21.1 100
    200-999 employees 12.1 26.0 34.2 5.6 22.2 100
    >999 employees 21.1 57.8 7.8 0.0 13.3 100
Other services 4.3 21.1 34.1 27.6 12.9 100
    Up to 199 employees 2.8 22.4 34.6 29.0 11.2 100
    200-999 employees 7.8 11.6 35.4 23.8 21.4 100
    >999 employees 25.1 30.9 18.4 11.3 14.3 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
Table 5 - On the domestic market, could you indicate the number of your competitors?
None <5 Between 5 and 20 >20 Don’t know/ no answer Total
Total 0.1 17.4 39.3 28.4 14.8 100
Manufacturing excl. food 0.2 18.0 47.0 23.8 11.0 100
Food 0.0 5.0 23.5 50.4 21.1 100
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100
Retail 0.0 15.2 30.3 25.0 29.5 100
Other services 0.1 26.6 35.4 27.3 10.6 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
As for the relationship between the firm and its customers, the firm was first asked to
evaluate the relative importance of its customers in terms of turnover, distinguishing
between firms, consumers – considering the various channels through which goods (or
services) are sold – and the public sector (question A8).
Around 47 per cent of our respondents sell their main product principally to other
firms (Figure 1) while around 16 per cent deal mainly with consumers; firms whose main
customer is the public sector only account for 1.5 per cent of the sample. This suggests that
the pricing strategies we are investigating refer mostly to producer or wholesale prices;
conversely, we are likely to capture less accurately price-setting behaviour at the consumer
stage.16









Other firms, consumers and the public sector
Notes: 
(1) More than 60 per cent of the firm’s main product turnover is related to sales to this
type of customer.
We then investigated whether the relationship between the firm and its main customers
is long-standing or only occasional (question A9). It is often argued that the existence of a
long-standing relationship might act as an “implicit” contract, hence leading the firm to
postpone price changes or to smooth them over a period of time. Clearly, the extent to which
this strategy is actually feasible also depends on the number of competitors: the larger this is,
the more convenient it is for the firm to try to establish long-standing relationships. This
aspect might also impact on the frequency of price changes, although the evidence is mixed.
Carlton (1986) finds that customers with no long-term relationships tend to prefer fixed-price
contracts because they fear that companies may exploit them by changing prices; hence,
prices would be more flexible if long-term relationships prevailed. On the contrary, the
evidence provided by Hall et al. (1997) suggests that firms review their prices less frequently
if they have mainly long-term clients.
11
The firms included in our sample have almost exclusively long-term (i.e. longer than
one year) relationships with other firms (Table 6), irrespective of the sector to which they
belong. Moreover, relationships with consumers are mostly of a long-term nature, although
the evidence in this case is somewhat more dispersed across sectors: while more than 98 per
cent of food firms report having mostly long-term customers, in manufacturing, retail and17
services occasional relationships are also quite important (36.5, 29.5 and 42.4 per cent,
respectively).  Formal statistical tests (Table C6 in Appendix C) confirm these sectoral
differences. Overall, the picture emerging from these results is in line with that obtained by
Blinder et al. (1998) and Hall et al. (1997).
Table 6 - Relationships with:
Firms Consumers
Long-term Occasional N° firms 
(1) Long-term Occasional N° firms 
(2)
Total 97.8 2.2 316 69.8 30.2   108
Manufacturing excl. Food 99.8 0.2 177 63.5 36.5 35
Food 99.0 1.0 36 98.8 1.2 17
Construction 100.0 0.0 4 0.0 0.0 0
Retail 91.5 8.5 44 70.5 29.5 32
Other services 95.3 4.7 56 57.6 42.4 24
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
 (1) Number of firms which reported having relationships
with other firms, with respect to which the percentages in the previous two columns are computed. - 
(2) Number of firms which
reported having relationships with consumers, with respect to which the percentages in the previous two columns are computed.
Finally, to complete the information on the market-related factors that might influence
the degree of nominal rigidity in the firm’s pricing behaviour, we enquired whether the firm
produces under increasing, constant or decreasing marginal costs. In theory, the flatter the
marginal cost curve, the more insensitive profits are to demand shocks and changes in
production (with nominal prices unchanged) and hence the less likely it is that the firm might
change its prices when production changes.
Table 7 -  How do your unit variable costs change when there is an increase in the level of production?
Increase Unchanged Decrease N.a 
(1) Total
Total 48.5 21.3 27.2 2.5 100
Manufacturing excl. food 45.5 19.4 34.8 0.3 100
Food 42.1 6.5 39.4 12.0 100
Construction 44.5 0.0 55.5 0.0 100
Retail 49.0 41.9 8.3 0.8 100
Other services 64.2 19.9 10.5 5.4 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
 (1) Firms which did not provide an answer.
                                                                                                                                            
11 Clearly, there might be differences across sectors, depending on the characteristics of the product and on
whether the customer is another firm or a consumer.18
Almost half of the respondents reported increasing marginal costs; the percentage is
higher in the retail and service industries, lower in manufacturing and food (Table 7).
12 The
sectoral dispersion could be related to the importance of capital equipment and to the degree
of capacity utilisation. Slightly more than 25 per cent of firms describe such these costs as
decreasing. This leaves around 21 per cent of firms reporting constant marginal costs, a
much lower percentage that found by Blinder et al. (1998).
Summing up, the reference market of the firms covered by our survey is mostly the
domestic one (local in the case of retail firms). On that market, they report having a lower
number of competitors in the industrial sector (where firms are generally larger) than in the
service and retail sector. Moreover, they tend to have long-term relationships with their
customers, in particular when those are other firms; occasional relationships are rather
important only in the retail and service sector. Finally, most firms have increasing marginal
costs. In general, the analysis presented so far shows the presence of important sectoral
differences.
4. Price setting
As a first piece of evidence concerning the main features of price-setting we assessed
the presence of some form of price discrimination according to the type of customer and/or
to the quantity of product sold (question B1).
Table 8 - The price of your main product is
(1):










Total 13.8 30.5 30.1 25.6 100
Manufacturing excl. Food 6.2 37.4 27.5 28.9 100
Food 18.7 29.9 22.3 29.1 100
Construction 0.0 0.0 65.1 34.9 100
Retail 37.9 16.6 14.7 30.8 100
Other services 16.1 21.1 56.0 6.8 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
 (1) As firms were allowed to tick up to two
answers, the total number of answers exceeds the number of firms. The percentages reported in the table are
computed with respect to the total number of answers.
                                                
12  See Table C7 in Appendix C.19
As expected, the resulting evidence is well dispersed across sectors (Table 8): in the
retail industry the price is mostly the same for all customers; in manufacturing and services it
tends either to differ according to the quantity sold or to be decided case by case. In
particular, service firms tend to set their price on the basis of a certain degree of direct
negotiation, which includes aspects that go beyond quantity (e.g. after sales assistance, etc.).
In construction, not surprisingly, the price is mostly decided case by case. Quantity
influences significantly firms’ pricing decisions only in the manufacturing and food sectors
(37.4 and 29.9 per cent of firms, respectively).
Companies were then asked to indicate how they set the price of their main product
(question B2). We distinguished between mark-up – either fixed or variable – pricing,
regulated prices and other strategies, allowing the firm to specify. Mark-up price-setting
behaviour dominates in all sectors (on average, more than 60 per cent of our firms use this
rule; Table 9), thus confirming results found in other studies. Around 13 per cent of total
respondents reported their price as being regulated; the percentage rises to 36.7 per cent and
16.6 per cent in the retail and in the service sector, respectively. The former could be due to
the fact that, for some goods, retailers tend not to have a high degree of freedom, their price
often being set by producers; the latter, instead, could derive from the strict regulatory
framework in certain sectors.
Table 9 - How do you normally set the price of your main product?
A mark-up is applied






Total 63.1 13.3 7.3 16.3 100
Manufacturing excl. food 68.6 8.6 5.4 17.4 100
Food 67.7 0.7 16.3 15.3 100
Construction 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100
Retail 49.7 36.7 7.1 6.5 100
Other services 52.3 16.6 8.5 22.6 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
As a complement to the above information, we tried to assess the influence of
competitive pressures on price-setting by asking firms how different would the price of their
main product be if they had no competitors on their reference market (question B3). Overall,
companies seem to be rather conscious of rival pricing strategies (Table 10): prices would be
either “very different” or “fairly different” for more than half of the respondents; they would
be only “slightly different” for a further 36.9 per cent of them. There is statistical evidence of20
significant sectoral differences (Table C10 in Appendix C): competitors’ prices are
particularly important in the industrial sector (where the number of competitors is smaller),
while around 20 per cent of retail and service firms would leave their price unchanged even
if they did not have any rivals. This might be due, on the one hand, to the fact that they
mostly operate on local domestic markets and, on the other hand, to the presence of quite a
stringent price regulation in these industries, as reported in Table 8.
In the manufacturing sector, we found through a simple correlation analysis that firms
in extremely concentrated markets (with less than  5 rivals) or with a large number of
competitors (more than 20 rivals; question A7 in the previous section) tend to be less
affected by rival prices than firms in oligopolistic markets.
Table 10 – How different would the price of your main product be if you did not have any









Total 10.1 36.9 29.4 21.3 2.4 100
Manufacturing excl. food 6.4 40.1 24.9 26.6 2.0 100
Food 1.7 50.5 36.1 11.7 0.0 100
Construction 0.0 0.0 95.2 4.8 0.0 100
Retail 17.9 31.6 34.3 10.0 6.2 100
Other services 20.8 24.8 30.5 21.9 2.0 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
 (1) Firms which did not provide an answer.
Finally, in order to gauge the relevance of market conditions on firms’ pricing
behaviour, we asked them to estimate by what percentage would the demand for their main
product fall were they to raise the price by 10 per cent (question B4). This was quite a
difficult question for many firms, as around half of them were not able (or did not want) to
give an evaluation of the perceived demand price elasticity.
Table 11 - By what percentage would the demand for your main product fall if you increased its price by 10%?
% demand reduction Manufacturing
excl. food
Food Construction Retail Other services Total
1-20 19.2 7.1 0.0 5.5  5.0 13.1
21-40 9.0 10.4 0.0 14.1 8.8 9.8
41-60  12.0 4.1 0.0  17.6 6.9  10.9
61-80 6.3  12.5  55.5 0.0 0.7 5.6
81-100 5.5 4.3  8.0 0.4 10.0 5.4
Don't know/no answer  48.0  61.6  36.5  63.0  68.7  55.3
    Mean = 4.5    Median = 4
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.21
Table 11 shows the distribution of the responses of the 150 firms or so that provided a
quantitative answer. Most companies said that they would face a reduction in the demand for
their main product of between 1 and 20 per cent, thus implicitly estimating the elasticity of
demand to be between 0.1 and 2. The estimated mean elasticity is 4.5 and the median is 4.0.
Compared to Blinder et al. (1998), who find that 40 per cent of the firms answering a similar
question believe their demand is totally insensitive to prices, our result seems to be quite
high, especially in retailing. As for the US, this evidence should be interpreted with a certain
caution.
Overall, there seem to be sectoral differences as regards price discrimination across
customers. Firms typically set their price on the basis of a mark-up rule on costs and are
rather conscious of rival pricing behaviour, particularly in the industrial sector. Retail and
service firms, instead, are less likely to look at competitors’ prices when setting their own,
possibly because of the higher degree of price regulation.
5. Price adjustment
In the third section of the questionnaire we focused directly on price adjustments. As
widely discussed in the literature, different factors might lie behind the fact that firms find it
optimal to adjust their prices only infrequently, and we explored to what extent the
alternative theories  of sticky prices are relevant in practice.
In principle, price adjustment takes place in two stages: the overall assessment of
whether the current price needs to be changed or not and the actual price change, once the
price review has indicated it would be appropriate to do so. The two actions do not
necessarily coincide and sticky behaviour can arise at both stages.
At the two extremes, firms might review their pricing policy only at very long discrete
time intervals, but once they have done so they change their price at once, or they might
review their  prices continuously, but then the actual change takes place only with a long
time lag. In practice, we expect price stickiness to be a combination of these two sources.22
5.1  The frequency of price reviews and changes
According to economic theory, there are two broad classes of price-adjustment
strategy: time-dependent rules, in which prices are reviewed periodically at given intervals,
and state-dependent rules, in which prices are adjusted when the deviation between the
current price and the optimal one becomes large enough to make the gain in profit from
adjustment outweigh the related cost (for example, the (s, S) type of adjustment rule).
Although both strategies imply that prices remain unchanged for periods of time, they
have quite different implications for monetary policy. Under time-dependent rules, the
higher the level of inflation the shorter is the time interval between revisions (in the extreme
case, in an hyperinflation framework prices are re-considered almost continuously, due to the
very high cost of inaction). On the contrary, under state-dependent rules what matters most is
likely to be the nature and the relevance of the shock that changes the economic situation
rather than the level of inflation.
In order to discriminate between the two rules, firms were asked whether they
normally review their prices at a particular frequency and/or they do so only in response to
particular events (question C1).
13
Around one quarter of the respondents normally review their prices only in response to
particular events, as against around 5 per cent which do it only periodically (Figure 2). The
majority of firms, 63 per cent, adopts both state and time-dependent pricing strategies. This
evidence is not in line with the results of Blinder et al. (1998) and Hall et al. (2000), where
60 per cent and 79 per cent, respectively, of the firms interviewed reported mainly following
time-dependent pricing rules.
                                                
13  The formulation of question was in line with the one proposed by Apel et al (2001) in their survey of
Swedish companies.23











(1) Firms which did not provide an answer.
Table 12 – Under normal conditions, the price of your main product is reviewed:





Other Total Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly Yearly Total
Total 69.3  26.6 4.1 100 6.9 7.7  13.9 14.6 56.7 100
Manufacturing excl. food 75.8  20.4 3.8 100 5.1 4.4  20.3 14.0 56.2 100
Food 69.7  28.5 1.8 100 0.8  30.1 1.6  17.5 50.0 100
Construction 44.5 0.0  55.4 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 100
Retail 51.2  48.2 0.6 100 7.6  8.5  15.4  19.2 49.4 100
Other services 64.8  29.5 5.7 100 17.1 0.0 3.3  11.3 68.4 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
 Firms were allowed to indicate both types.
The firms that normally revise their price in response to specific events are more
affected by cost changes than by variations in demand conditions; this broadly holds across
all economic sectors, although prices are very  sensitive to demand shocks for retail firms
(Table 12 and Table C12 in Appendix C for the significance tests). More than half of the
firms which adopt time-dependent rules review their price only once a year, and around 15
per cent at quarterly intervals. In the food, retail and service sectors price reviews tend to
take place more frequently: around one third of firms in the food producing industry and 8.5
per cent of those in retailing evaluate their prices every week, while around 17 per cent of
service firms report a daily frequency of price reviews.
Having assessed how and how often firms review their pricing policies, we asked them
how many times they actually changed the price of their main product in 2001 and in 200224
(question C6).
14 Results point to a certain degree of stickiness in all sectors (differences are
not statistically significant, as shown in Table C13 in Appendix C): the majority of
respondents apparently changed their price only once, around 10 per cent twice (Table 13).
Less than 10 per cent changed their price more than every two months. It is worth noting that
12 per cent of respondents report no price change in 2002, the percentage being higher in the
food producing and service sectors.
However, a note of caution is needed regarding the implications that can be deduced
from the answers to this question, since around 40 per cent of the firms did not provide an
answer at all. A very high non-response rate was recorded in the construction, service and
retail industries.
Table 13 - How many times did you actually change the price of your main product in 2002?
0 1 2 3 to 6 7 to 12 Over 12 Do not know/
no answer
Total
Total 12.0 29.8 9.8 3.4 1.4 3.2 40.3 100
Manufacturing excl. food 12.3 36.9 12.4 3.4 1.1 3.7 31.2 100
Food 15.6 19.2 4.3 0.5 8.5 8.4 43.5 100
Construction 4.8 0.0 0.0 36.5 0.0 0.0 58.7 100
Retail 7.3 20.6 13.8 7.2 0.0 2.6 48.5 100
Other services 13.5 24.1 2.3 0.3 1.6 0.0 58.3 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
If one takes into account only the companies that provided information concerning
both the frequency of price reviews and the number of price changes, the evidence suggests
that actual changes tend to be slightly less frequent than reviews (Figure 3): almost 60 per
cent of the respondents typically review their price once a year, while about 50 per cent of
them actually change it with that frequency. The median frequency of price reviews – once a
year – is the same as the median frequency of price changes (the 5
th and 95
th percentiles
were, respectively, 0 and 30 changes).
                                                
14  We also asked about 2001 in order to try to account for the temporary deviation from usual pricing
policies in 2002 due to the euro cash changeover. The answers for the two years were very similar. Though in
theory firms’ pricing policies could have been affected by the euro cash changeover also in 2001, in which case
answers for that year would not represent a reliable crosscheck for the robustness of results on the frequency of
price changes, we have some piece of evidence that this was not the case. In fact, in the survey of price
expectations conducted in September 2001, the majority of the interviewed firms (around 74 per cent) reported
that their selling prices would have not been affected by the euro cash changeover. Only half of the remaining
26 per cent reported having changed their pricing policies in 2001.25
These results, showing a rather high degree of price stickiness in Italy, are in line with
those obtained for the UK by Hall et al. (2000), for the US by Blinder et al. (1998) and for
Sweden by Apel et al.(2001).











0   1   Yearly   2 to 6  Quarterly   Monthly   7 to 12   Weekly 
and daily 
Over 12  
Notes: The figure is based on the answers to questions C1.2 and C6.
If firms have not experienced any major shock during the two-year period over which
we asked them to provide information on the actual number of price changes, it might be
misleading to interpret the reported low frequency of actual price adjustments only in terms
of nominal price rigidity. A complementary piece of information is whether, and for how
long, firms are willing to sustain a price that is not optimal. Hence, firms were asked whether
they would accept, temporarily, their price being below unit variable costs (question C3)
and, if so, for how long (questions C4).
Table 14 - Is it possible that the price of your main product is below your
unit variable costs?
Yes No N.a. 
(1) Total
Total 26.0 67.8 6.2 100
Manufacturing excl. food 19.4 71.8 8.8 100
Food 34.9 65.1 0.0 100
Constructions 8.0 92.0 0.0 100
Retail 26.7 69.1 4.2 100
Other services 41.5 54.7 3.9 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
  
(1) Firms which did
not provide an answer.
For the majority of respondents (around 70 per cent) prices cannot fall below unit
variable costs (Table 14). Of those that allow their prices to be lower than unit variable costs26
(around 25 per cent), more than half do so for up to six months and around 10 per cent for a
period from six months to one year (Table 15).
Table 15 - If the answer to the previous question is "yes",
for how many months would you be willing to accept a
price level below unit variable costs?
    Months: n° firms %
    0 4  4.7
    1  8  9.3
    2 10 11.6
    3  20  23.3
    5 0  0.0
    6 6  7.0
    12 3  3.5
    Don't know  35  40.7
    Total  86 100
5.2  Why are prices sticky?
In testing alternative theoretical explanations which may lead a firm to temporarily
deviate from its profit-maximising price, we followed the approach of Blinder et al. (1998),
Hall  et al. (2000) and Apel et al. (2001). In order to assess the relative importance of
different theories of price stickiness, we asked firms to rank according to importance a
number of factors that might delay the actual implementation of a price revision (question
C2).
15 We considered the following explanations
16:
•   Co-ordination failure - a firm does not change its price fearing that it will trigger a
price war. According to the literature on tacit collusive behaviour, no firm would
want to be the first to change prices, even when there are the conditions for doing so,
in order to avoid setting off a process at the end of which all market participants
would be worse-off. In practice, the importance of this behaviour might change in
relation to the sector and to the nature of the shocks affecting the firm’s optimal
price, in particular whether they are perceived as “global” or “firm-specific”. Our
                                                
15  The firms interviewed were asked to rank these factors on a scale from 1 (“unimportant”) to 4 (“very
important”).
16  In formalising the list of alternative theoretical explanations of price rigidity, we selected a smaller
number of theories with respect to the mentioned studies, in order to simplify the ranking process on the firms’
side. However, the relevance of other theories often outlined in the literature as potential causes of price
stickiness was assessed in other parts of the questionnaire through separate questions (for example the role of
marginal costs, price as a signal for quality, stock adjustment, delivery time).27
survey allows us to draw some conclusions about the former aspect (type of sector)
but not the latter (type of shock).
•   Temporary shocks – a firm might not find it optimal to change its price if it believes
that it will soon have to change it in the opposite direction.
•   Explicit contracts – the transactions between a firm and its customers involve explicit
contracts which, acting as insurance against uncertain market conditions, are
designed to maintaining stable prices, at least until re-negotiation.
•   Pricing thresholds – a firm might fix its prices at attractive thresholds. This implies a
discontinuous relationship between price and demand: for instance, in order to
increase the price to a new threshold the firm must suffer a greater fall in demand
compared with the case in which attractive prices are not relevant. The evidence
available for the euro area, based on the analysis of consumer prices, suggests that
this pricing behaviour is actually quite widespread (for Italy see Mostacci and
Sabbatini, 2003).
•   Menu costs – a firm might be reluctant to adjust its prices immediately in response to
a demand or supply shock because of the physical and information costs involved in
the adjustment process.
•   Bureaucratic reasons – the process of changing prices might be very time and
resource consuming for bureaucratic reasons.
According to the answers provided by our respondents, nominal contracts are an
important factor underlying a firm’s decision to postpone price adjustments (Table 16). In
rank terms, explicit contracts turned out to be the most important reason, as in the survey
conducted by the Bank of England.
17 As expected, there is some variation in the importance
of this aspect across economic sectors: the rank is quite high in the service sector and much
lower in retailing (see Table C16 in Appendix C).
The theory which received, overall, the second highest rank is co-ordination failure
(the same result as in Blinder’s survey). This evidence is consistent with the importance that28
companies attribute to rival prices as emerged earlier in the analysis. In principle, collusive
behaviour between companies should be less likely either in very competitive markets,
where firms are by definition price-takers and  so do not engage in price-wars with their
rivals, or, at the other extreme, in very concentrated markets, where co-ordination is
relatively easy. Therefore, one would expect this explanation of price stickiness to be
considered more important by firms operating in industries with a degree of competition
between these two extremes. We found only a moderate difference across firms facing
different level of competition.
The third explanation of the inertial behaviour of prices, in terms of ranking assigned
by our respondents, is the fact that firms do not adjust their price in response to a shock
because of the perceived temporary nature of the shock itself. In particular, this factor was
considered important or very important by about 30 per cent of the firms in the retail and
food industries.
As in the surveys conducted by Blinder and his associates and by the Bank of England,
some of the factors often indicated in the literature as important causes of price stickiness do
not seem to be considered such by firms. In particular, price-setting at attractive thresholds
and menu costs, as well as bureaucratic rigidities, were overall ranked quite low by firms
(1.4, 1.6 and 1.3, respectively).
As expected, however, both pricing thresholds and menu costs were, overall,
recognised more widely in retailing than in the other sectors.
18 In the case of pricing
thresholds, in particular, around 33 per cent of respondents in the retail industry considered
this aspect important or very important, as against 11.2 per cent for manufacturing, 31.6 per
cent for food and 8.7 per cent for other services.
                                                                                                                                            
17  In Blinder’s study this theory ranked fourth.
18  The low ranking of pricing thresholds somehow contrasts with the evidence provided by other studies
based on Italian micro consumer prices, which show instead that this pricing behaviour is extremely
widespread (Mostacci and Sabbatini, 2003). However, the two pieces of evidence can be reconciled considering
that the prices analysed in our survey are presumably “producer prices” and so it is quite reasonable that
attractive thresholds play a limited role at the early stage of the distribution chain.29
Table 16 – Which of the factors listed below might lead to a delay in the actual price change?
Total Manufacturing excl. food Food Construction Retail Other services
The fear that competing firms will not adjust their selling price
Unimportant 10.6 10.9 12.5 - 1.1 17.0
Of minor importance 30.0 28.8 24.9 - 35.6 34.2
Important 38.4 38.2 44.3 95.2 42.0 28.4
Very important 13.3 14.4 18.3 4.8 10.4 9.4
N.a. 
(1) 7.8 7.6 - - 10.9 11.1
Mean score 2.59 2.61 2.68 3.05 2.69 2.34
The fear that subsequently you will need to modify the price in the opposite direction
Unimportant 30.0 28.9 33.7 58.6 25.8 32.8
Of minor importance 34.7 38.2 29.1 - 35.7 28.5
Important 18.9 19.8 15.1 4.8 23.7 15.5
Very important 4.2 1.7 16.7 - 3.5 4.9
N.a. 
(1) 12.2 11.4 5.4 36.6 11.4 18.3
Mean score 1.97 1.93 2.16 1.15 2.01 1.91
The presence of a contract which states conditions that can be changed only when the contract is re-negotiated
Unimportant 18.2 14.6 18.5 - 39.2 12.1
Of minor importance 14.5 15.6 6.9 36.5 22.5 7.2
Important 37.1 37.3 49.3 - 33.5 34.2
Very important 19.0 17.5 25.2 63.5 0.2 33.3
N.a. 
(1) 11.2 14.9 - - 4.7 13.2
Mean score 2.64 2.68 2.81 3.27 1.94 3.02
The price is set at "attractive" thresholds and is changed only when it is convenient to move to a new one
Unimportant 63.5 68.6 53.3 63.5 45.9 69.4
Of minor importance 13.0 14.5 11.6 36.5 10.2 10.0
Important 8.6 1.9 26.1 - 21.2 8.1
Very important 2.6 0.1 5.5 - 11.5 0.7
N.a. 
(1) 12.3 14.8 3.6 - 11.2 11.8
Mean score 1.43 1.22 1.83 1.36 1.98 1.32
The presence of high costs of changing prices
Unimportant 54.1 55.3 51.7 95.2 47.2 55.1
Of minor importance 23.5 24.7 33.9 - 19.9 17.3
Important 9.8 9.3 5.2 4.8 12.1 12.5
Very important 3.2 0.0 9.1 - 9.8 4.1
N.a. 
(1) 9.5 10.7 - - 10.9 11.0
Mean score 1.58 1.48 1.72 1.09 1.83 1.61
Bureaucratic rigidities
Unimportant 64.6 67.6 48.4 95.2 56.8 70.4
Of minor importance 19.8 18.5 34.3 - 28.4 8.4
Important 2.7 1.4 8.4 - 3.6 2.8
Very important 0.3 - - 4.8 - 1.4
N.a. 
(1) 12.6 12.5 8.9 - 11.2 17.1
Mean score 1.30 1.24 1.56 1.14 1.40 1.22
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
  Two-sided t-tests were computed, for the whole sample of firms,
for each pair of explanatory theories in order to assess whether the mean scores were significantly different. The results indicate that
the null hypothesis of pairwise equality across mean scores can always be rejected with the exception of the following pairs: a)
collusive behaviour and explicit contracts, b) attractive thresholds and menu costs.
All in all, the evidence reported in this section suggests that prices are indeed quite
rigid, the median firm reviewing and changing its price only once a year. Firms seem to
follow mostly state-dependent pricing rules for adjusting their price, or a mixture of time and
state-dependent rules. Notably, the theories of price rigidity – nominal contracts and co-
ordination failure – ranked by our respondents among the most important are the same
singled out in similar studies for the US, the UK and Sweden. As regard sectoral behaviour,30
significant differences emerge between manufacturing and retail firms and, interestingly
enough, between retail and other services firms.
6. Asymmetries in price adjustment: how do firms respond to shocks?
The last section of the questionnaire focuses on whether firms, facing a shock, behave
symmetrically irrespective of the source of the shock or whether prices have to be increased
or decreased.
Table 17 - Which factors would be likely to cause an increase/decrease in the price of your main product?
INCREASE DECREASE
An increase/decrease in the cost of labour
Unimportant 4.6 18.7
Of minor importance 22.4 32.0
Important 51.6 27.0
Very important 18.5 14.1
N.a
.(1) 2.9 8.3
Mean score 2.9 2.4
An increase/decrease in the cost of raw materials
Unimportant 4.9 10.4
Of minor importance 7.2 15.4
Important 40.2 38.3
Very important 42.6 26.2
N.a.
(1) 5.1 9.7
Mean score 3.3 2.9
An increase/decrease in financial costs
Unimportant 14.3 21.9
Of minor importance 45.6 42.7
Important 25.4 19.2
Very important 9.2 5.1
N.a.
(1) 5.6 11.2
Mean score 2.3 2.1
A rise/fall in demand
Unimportant 13.0 8.0
Of minor importance 38.1 23.3
Important 34.1 41.8
Very important 8.2 17.5
N.a.
(1) 6.6 9.4
Mean score 2.4 2.8
Price increase/decrease by one or more competitors
Unimportant 10.5 8.1
Of minor importance 30.2 25.8
Important 41.9 35.9
Very important 10.4 22.4
N.a.
(1) 7.0 7.9
Mean score 2.6 2.8
Notes: Two-sided t-tests were computed for each pair of explanatory factor in order to assess whether the mean scores were
significantly different. The results indicate that the null hypothesis of pairwise equality across mean scores can always be
rejected with the exception of the following factors driving a decrease in prices: costs of raw materials, demand changes and
price changes by competitors.31
Firms were asked to evaluate the relevance of a number of factors (cost of labour and
of raw materials, financial costs, demand conditions, competitors’ strategies) as driving
forces behind upwards (question D1) or downwards (question D3) price movements.
Overall, firms judge cost shocks (of labour and other inputs) to be rather important in
driving their prices upwards or downwards (Table 17). The impact, however, is relatively
more important when prices have to be increased than when they have to be reduced.
As for changes in demand conditions, only around 42 per cent of firms reported this
factor as being “important” or “very important” in determining price increases. Demand
shocks affect price changes asymmetrically, since they seem to exert much stronger pressure
on prices when these have to be decreased.
The influence of competitors’ behaviour on price adjustments, which already emerged
in the previous sections, although generally quite high, seems to be slightly stronger in
driving prices downwards than upwards. On the contrary, financial costs do not appear
among the major sources of adjustments in prices, particularly downwards.
Having ascertained the main sources of price increases and decreases, we investigated
the significance of particular factors in preventing a prompt adjustment in both directions.
Concerning upward adjustments, we asked firms whether, facing a positive demand
shock, they first act on non-price elements, such as delivery times or the level of stocks,
instead of increasing their price (Question D2). Most firms, irrespective of economic sector,
would not consider extending the delivery time in the presence of a demand increase (51.6
per cent on average; Table 18). They are more willing to change the level of stocks, with the
expected exception of firms in the service sector.
Table 18 - If demand for your main product increased, before you raised the price level,
would you first consider
An extension in delivery time Changing the level of stocks
Yes No N.a.
(1) Total Yes No N.a.
 (1) Total
Total 28.5 51.6 19.9 100 38.0 42.5 19.5 100
Manufacturing excl. food 35.4 51.2 13.4 100 46.0 40.9 13.1 100
Food 23.1 66.6 10.3 100 41.7 51.7 6.6 100
Construction 0.0 100.0 0.0 100 96.8 3.2 0.0 100
Retail 27.1 38.3 34.6 100 36.9 37.2 25.9 100
Other services 13.9 51.6 34.5 100 8.5 48.5 43.0 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
 (1) Firms which did not provide an answer.32
As for downward adjustments, we asked firms if they fear that customers would
perceive a price reduction as a fall in the quality of the goods or services (question D4).
Overall, as found in other studies, the results suggest this is not an important factor in
preventing firms from reducing their prices (Table 19).
Table 19 - If you were about to reduce the price of your main
product, would you fear that customers might assume you had
reduced its quality?
Yes No Do not know/
no answer
Total
Total 11.8 73.3 14.9 100
Manufacturing excl. food 9.4 77.4 13.2 100
Food 26.5 67.5 6.0 100
Construction 55.5 45.5 0.0 100
Retail 4.3 73.8 21.9 100
Other services 13.6 65.5 20.8 100
Notes: For the significance of sectoral differences, see Appendix C.
In the remainder of this section we explore, through an empirical exercise, the factors
likely to affect the response of prices to shocks, focusing in particular on the presence of
some form of asymmetry in price adjustment. For a given demand or cost shock firms might,
in fact, react differently if they have to adjust their price upwards or downwards in relation
to the direction of the shock. Moreover, irrespective of its direction, they might respond
differently to demand and cost shocks.
19 Our approach follows the analysis presented in
Small and Yates (1999), allowing a direct comparison with their results.
The variable we used to capture the relative stickiness of prices in response to different
shocks is based on firms’ answers concerning the factors underlying negative and positive
price changes (described in Table 17). Specifically, we created four dummy variables, which
describe the probability of firms increasing their price in response to a increase in demand or
costs (pud and puc, respectively) and lowering their price in response to a fall in demand or
costs (pld and plc, respectively).
                                                
19  For example, Rotemberg and Saloner (1997) show that in a duopoly the incentives for competitors to
adjust the price level to a shock in costs are greater than in a monopoly. The underlying idea is that the cost in
terms of profit losses of a competitor not raising (reducing) its price when costs increase (decrease) is very
high: at the outside, it will end up supplying all the market but incurring losses on every unit of output if there
is a cost increase, or losing all its market share if it remains inactive in the presence of a fall in costs. By
contrast, the incentives to inaction in the presence of a demand shock are greater in a monopoly than in a
duopoly.33
Since the dependent variables are defined as zero-one dummies, we estimated a probit
model of the form:
20
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where yj denotes the probability of observing a change in firm j’s price in response to a
demand or a cost shock (pud, puc, pld, plc) and xij represents a set of i explanatory variables
for firm j, which might influence the way in which prices react to shocks. For the latter we
considered a number of propositions advanced in the theoretical literature on price
stickiness.
First, we explored the possibility that, as Ball and Romer (1990) argue, nominal prices
are stickier in a market where firms’ profits do not change much in the face of shocks – in
other words, that real rigidity magnifies nominal rigidity. According to this concept, the
more sensitive profits are to shocks (with prices unchanged), the more likely it is that firms
will react  by changing prices. In order to test this proposition, we considered several factors
determining the degree of real rigidity.
The first is the degree of market competition. In principle, the more competitive the
market, the more likely it is that a firm will adjust its price in response to shocks in order to
avoid a fall in profits. Hence, for a given nominal rigidity (due for instance to the presence of
menu costs), stronger competition should induce a greater responsiveness of prices to cost
and demand shocks (Martin, 1993; Small and Yates, 1999). On the basis of our survey we
constructed a number of variables capturing the degree of market competition: the firm’s
reported market share (mkt_shr); the number of its competitors (rivals); how the firm would
set its prices if it had no rivals (comp_press).
A further feature affecting the degree of real rigidity is the nature of the relationship
between the firm and its customers. A firm can sell its main product to other firms or directly
to final consumers. In the first case it is likely that lower search costs are sustained by
customers to collect the information needed to act optimally. Therefore, the probability that
the firm adjusts its price in response to shocks is greater than in the case in which the firm
                                                
20  See Maddala (1983).34
deals mainly with final consumers, which face higher search costs. Similarly, the existence
of a long-term relationship between the firm and its customers is likely to generate a
resistance to change prices continuously in order not to disappoint them. This line of
reasoning is similar to that followed by Small and Yates (1999), who refer in their analysis
to the concept of “customer markets” introduced by Okun (1981). In order to capture the
nature of the firm’s relationship with its customers we constructed a dummy variable
reflecting the fact that the firm deals mainly with other firms (customer) and one that
identifies whether the firm discriminates the price depending on the customer (price_discr).
We also created a dummy allowing for the possibility that the price is subject to some form
of regulation (price_reg).
The last proxy for real rigidity is a variable that records whether the firm’s marginal
cost curve is flat (MC). As Hall (1986) recognises, variable marginal costs should make price
adjustments more likely in the face of a shock.
An additional reason why a firm might not adjust its prices in response to shocks is
that it mainly sells its products abroad and therefore adopts a form of “pricing-to market”.
We constructed two types of variable to investigate the validity of the pricing-to-market
model: a dummy that identifies whether the firm’s share of turnover due to exports is above
40 per cent (exp_share); and a dummy that records whether the firm identifies the foreign
market as being the principal one for its main product (ext_mkt). It has to be borne in mind,
however, that these two measures could also partly capture the degree of competition faced
by the firm.
Finally, we constructed a set of dummy variables to control for the type of economic
activity, the size of the firm and the geographical area in which it is based, which also help to
account for unobserved characteristics of the firm that might impact on price behaviour but
are not captured by the previous explanatory variables.
21
                                                
21 The full set of variables is listed in detail in Appendix C. Note that some variables which could have
been of considerable interest, e.g., the elasticity of demand (question B4), and the possibility of the price being
below unit variable costs (questions C3 and C4) have not been included in the above list owing to the large
percentage of missing values.35
To gauge the presence of some form of asymmetry in the firm’s pricing behaviour
when prices have to be adjusted upwards or downwards, we estimated the above model
separately for demand and cost shocks (Tables 20 and 21, respectively). For each type of
shock we carried out separate regressions for upward and downward shocks. The first and
third column in each table contain the results obtained including all the variables in the
regression; the second and fourth column present instead restricted versions of the model,
including only the variables that turned out to be significant or to significantly affect the
overall equation.
As far as demand shocks are concerned, Table 20 shows that market structure, as
captured by the degree of competitive pressure perceived by the firm (comp_press),
significantly affects the probability of price adjustments in face of a shock, whether positive
or negative: as expected, prices tend to change more promptly in a more competitive
environment. We also find, as expected, that the probability of raising prices faced with a
positive demand shock is significantly lower for firms with a flat marginal cost function
(MC), while this feature does not have an impact in the case of a negative shock. Similarly,
the fact that the firm’s customers incur lower search costs (customer) is positively correlated
with the responsiveness of prices to a demand increase, although it has no significant effect
in the case of a demand decrease.
22 There is no evidence supporting what theoretically
postulated by pricing-to-market models.
                                                
22  This result contrasts with that obtained by Small and Yates (1999) in a similar exercise, as they find
search costs to be significant only in the case of cost shocks.36
Table 20 - Price adjustment in response to a demand shock
(Probit estimates)
Reduce price in response to a fall in demand
(PLD)
Raise price in response to a rise in demand
(PUD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 2.33 (0.98)  1.95 (0.85) -0.33 (1.00)  -0.99 (1.02)
Mkt_shr1 -0.36 (0.78) -1.23 ** (0.46)
Mkt_shr4 -0.04 (0.38) -0.49 (0.39)
Mkt_shr10 0.14 (0.29) -0.60 (0.40)
Comp_press 0.66 **( 0 . 2 0 ) 0.79 ** (0.26) 0.62 ** (0.29) 0.78 ** (0.24)
MC -0.30 (0.36) -0.17 (0.33) -0.64 * (0.37) -0.58 ** (0.30)
Customer 0.005 (0.31) 0.68 ** (0.30) 0.94 ** (0.24)
Price_discr -0.24 (0.44) -0.33 (0.41)
Exp_share 0.53 *( 0 . 4 0 ) 0.39 (0.35) 0.20 (0.39) 0.13 (0.30)
Price_reg -0.63 (0.42) -0.58 (0.39) -0.41 (0.43)
Manufacturing -0.55 (0.74) -0.58 (0.70) -1.14 (0.95) 0.56 (1.01)
Retail -0.55 (0.86) 0.72 (0.74) -1.60 (1.03) 1.13 (1.05)
Other services -1.23 (0.80) -1.12 (0.73) 0.49 (1.01) 0.21 (1.03)
Food -0.59 (0.85) -0.17 (0.78) 1.33 (0.99) 1.55 (1.04)
North-west -0.49 (0.34) -1.40 ** (0.46) -0.53 (0.45) -0.47 (0.37)
North-east -1.48 ** (0.49) -1.13 ** (0.48) -0.31 (0.45) -0.25 (0.39)
Centre -1.02 ** (0.51) -0.86 * (0.49) -0.40 (0.47) -0.17 (0.43)
Up to 199 employees -0.96 * (0.53) -0.27 (0.29) -0.55 * (0.33) -0.34 * (0.25)
200-999 employees -0.48 (0.37) -0.05 (0.29) -0.77 ** (0.33) -0.99 (1.03)
Number of observations 201 236 205 268
LogL -110.8 -130.2 -115.6 -151.97
Pseudo R
2 0.189 0.172 0.17 0.17
χ
2 (dof) 35.8 (18) [0.007] 33.7 (13) [0.001] 29.3 (18) [0.044] 43.7 (13) [0.00]
Notes: Weighted estimates. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance level, respectively.
Values in round brackets are the estimated standard errors. Values in square brackets are the estimated p-values of the test statistics.
Columns (1) and (3) present results obtained including all the variables in the regression; columns (2) and (4) present those obtained
with only the significant ones.
As for the reaction of prices to cost changes, Table 21 shows that the probability of
lowering prices in response to a decrease in costs is significantly and inversely correlated
with the degree of market power (mkt_shr1) while it not affected by search costs
(customer).
23 The same effects appear also in the case of cost increases. The latter seem also
to be more easily translated into prices when there is some form of price regulation. Firms
mainly operating on foreign markets (extmkt) seem to have a significantly lower price
responsiveness to both positive and negative cost shocks, hence supporting the hypothesis of
some form of nominal rigidity due to pricing-to-market behaviour.
                                                
23  Small and Yates (1999) find similar results for search costs but no significant effect for market
competition.37
Table 21 - Price adjustment in response to a cost shock
(Probit estimates)
Reduce price in response to a fall in
costs (PLC)
Raise price in response to a rise in
costs (PUC)
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Constant 2.55 (0.99)  1.91 (0.77) 1.56 (0.88)  1.26 (0.87)
Mkt_shr1 -1.33 ** (0.46) -1.41 ** (0.45) -1.19 * (0.65) -1.06 ** (0.53)
Mkt_shr4 -0.49 (0.47) -0.29 (0.42) -0.24 (0.39) -0.14 (0.41)
Mkt_shr10 -0.57 (0.40) -0.42 (0.37) 1.14 * (0.69) 1.17 * (0.66)
Comp_press -0.41 (0.33) -0.22 (0.45)
Customer 0.26 (0.30) 0.21 (0.21) -0.22 (0.42) -0.18 (0.44)
Price_discr 0.89 ** (0.33) 1.18 (0.36) 0.53 (0.48) -0.61 (0.56)
Extmkt -1.22 ** (0.38) -1.08 ** (0.36) -1.11 ** (0.47) -1.09 ** (0.47)
Price_reg -0.32 (0.40) 0.89 * (0.54) 0.96 * (0.51)
Manufacturing -0.05 (0.73) 0.05 (0.69)
Retail -0.08 (0.84) -0.03 (0.80)
Other services -0.62 (0.79) -0.54 (0.74)
Food -1.26 (0.83) -1.11 (0.76)
North-west -0.19 (0.45) -0.26 (0.42) 0.55 (0.64) 0.56 (0.63)
North-east -0.56 (0.46) -0.46 (0.44) 0.31 (0.64) 0.31 (0.62)
Centre -0.76 (0.52) -0.51 (0.46) 1.79 (0.79) 1.18 (0.76)
Up to 199 employees -0.22 (0.41) -0.10 (0.38) 0.34 (0.52) 0.41 (0.49)
200-999 employees 0.04 (0.39) -0.09 (0.38) 1.45 ** (0.73) 1.44 ** (0.71)
Number of observations 221 244 224 226
LogL -88.7 -98.9 -25.6 -25.6
Pseudo R
2 0.21 0.22 0.34 0.34
χ
2 (dof) 48.45 (17) [0.000] 51.9 (14) [0.000] 47.6 (12) [0.000] 48.1 (11) [0.000]
Notes: Weighted estimates. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance level,
respectively. Values in round brackets are the estimated standard errors. Values in square brackets are the estimated p-values of
the test statistics. Columns (1) and (3) present results obtained including all the variables in the regression; columns (2) and (4)
present those obtained with only the significant ones.
As a final piece of evidence we pooled together the increases and decreases and
estimated two separate regressions for demand and cost shocks, testing the significance of
the “increase” dummies in both cases (Table 22). This exercise highlights an important form
of asymmetry in the responsiveness of prices to changes in cost and demand: while a
demand increase is less likely to induce a price change than a demand decrease, a cost
increase is much more likely to prompt a price change than a cost decrease.
24
Summarising, the results point to the existence of interesting forms of asymmetry in
the adjustment of prices to positive and negative shocks, in particular on the demand side.
First, real rigidities, as captured by a flat marginal cost curve, on the one hand, and by the
fact that customers incur high search costs, on the other hand,  reduce the responsiveness of
nominal prices to a positive change in demand but not to a negative one. Second, both
market structure, as measured by the firm’s degree of market power, and some form of
pricing-to-market rigidity seem to enhance nominal price stickiness in response to cost38
shocks. Third, price responsiveness to changes in costs is greater when the changes are
positive than when they are negative, while in the case of demand changes prices seem to be
more rigid upwards than downwards.
Table 22 - Price adjustment: pooling positive and negative shocks
(Probit estimates)
Change price in response
to a change in demand
Change price in response
to a change in costs
 (1)  (2)
Constant 1.40 (0.63) 1.64 (0.65)
Demand_up/Cost_up -0.51 ** (0.18) 1.02 ** (0.25)
Mkt_shr1 -0.64 ** (0.31) -1.43 ** (0.37)
Mkt_shr4 -0.34 (0.26) -0.14 (0.33)
Mkt_shr10 -0.45 * (0.26) -0.24 (0.32)
Customer 0.46 ** (0.20)
Price_discr 1.09 ** (0.33)
MC -0.38 * (0.24)
Exp_share 0.26 (0.26)
Ext_mkt -1.05 ** (0.29)
Price_reg -0.63 ** (0.29)
Manufacturing 0.11 (0.66) -0.02 (0.63)
Retail 0.39 (0.70) -0.09 (0.70)
Other services -0.30 (0.68) -0.34 (0.67)
Food 0.61 (0.68) -1.10 * (0.67)
North –west -0.72 ** (0.29) -0.29 (0.34)
North-east -0.51 * (0.31) -0.31 (0.36)
Centre -0.57 * (0.32) -0.11 (0.38)
Up to 199 employees -0.48 ** (0.21) 0.06 (0.31)
200-999 employees -0.40 ** (0.21) 0.43 (0.31)





2 (dof) 48.1 (15) [0.000] 74.8 (15) [0.000]
Notes: Weighted estimates. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 5 per cent and 10
per cent significance level, respectively. Values in round brackets are the estimated standard
errors. Values in square brackets are the estimated p-values of the test statistics.
7. Conclusions
The evidence of the nature and causes of price stickiness based on a recent Bank of
Italy survey of price-setting behaviour in Italy is consistent in many respects with that
emerging from similar analyses for the US, the UK and Sweden.
As in previous studies, our results suggest the presence of a considerable degree of
nominal stickiness, which emerges both at the stage in which firms evaluate their pricing
strategies and the stage in which they actually have to implement the price change. Indeed,
price changes are only slightly less frequent than price reviews.
                                                                                                                                            
24  This result is very similar to that obtained by Small and Yates (1999).39
Among the alternative explanations advocated by the theoretical literature to explain
nominal price rigidity, three are ranked highest by the firms interviewed: explicit contracts,
tacit collusive behaviour
25 and the perception of the temporary nature of the shock.
26
In reviewing their prices firms mostly follow state-dependent rules or a combination of
time and state-dependent ones. This evidence differs from that found for the US and the UK,
where time-dependent rules prevail.
Prices respond asymmetrically to shocks, depending on the direction of the adjustment
(positive vs negative) and the source of the shock (demand vs supply). This asymmetry is
affected by variety of factors, some of which are related to the degree of real rigidity – i.e.
the competitive structure of the market, the relationships with customers, the shape of the
firm’s marginal cost curve. Cost shocks impact more when prices have to be raised than
when they have to be reduced, while demand decreases are more likely to induce a price
change than demand increases.
                                                
25  This is consistent with the importance firms attribute to rival prices in their price-setting strategies,
especially industrial firms.
26  The same theories were ranked in the top five places in terms of importance in the surveys conducted in
the US, the UK and Sweden.Appendix A - The questionnaire
Preliminary remarks
•   The answers must refer to year 2002
•   If your firm produces (or sells) more goods or services, the answers, where explicitly stated, must
refer to the "main product (or service)". For instance, if the firm produces (or sells) several types of
hats and shoes, by "product" we mean "hats" and "shoes" (irrespective of the specific type), whereas
by "main product" we mean the one which in 2002 generated the highest turnover.
SECTION A - GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE MARKET IN WHICH THE FIRM OPERATES
A1. How many products does your firm produce (or sell)?……|__________________________________________________|
A2. What is your "main product"?………………………………….__________________________________________________
A3. What is the percentage of turnover due to your "main product"?…………………………………………… ………  |__|__|__|%
A4. What is the most important market (in terms of
turnover) for your "main product"?
 (please tick only one answer)
•  Italian  market:
"Local” market ……………………….…….
"National” market ………….………………
•   Other euro area countries ………………………
•   Countries outside the euro area………………..
A5. If you sell your "main product" abroad, what is the
percentage of your turnover due to exports?
•  …………………………………………………….
•   I do not know, I do not want to answer ……… |_|_|_|%
A6. With reference to your "main product" and the Italian
market, your firm is, in terms of market share (if you sell
your “main product” only on the "local" market, please refer
the answer to it):
(please tick only one answer)
•   The first firm ……………………………………….
•   One of the first 4 firms ……………………………
•   One of the first 10 firms ………………………….
•   Not among the first 10 firms……………………..
•   I do not know, I do not want to answer …………
A7. With reference to your "main product" and the Italian
market, could you indicate the number of your competitors
(if you sell your main product only on the "local" market,
please refer the answer to it)?
(please tick only one answer)
•  None………………………………………………..
•   < 5 ……..……………………………………………
•   Between 5 and  20 ………………………………..
•  >  20………………………………………………….
•   I do not know, I do not want to answer …………41
A8. In what percentage the turnover generated by your
"main product" is due to sales to:
•   Other firms ……………………………………...
•   Consumers, through large retailers…………..
•   Consumers, through your own distribution
network or through a network under your control
•   Consumers, through small retailers….…………
•   Consumers through other channels (e.g.
catalogues, internet, etc.) ..……………….…….









A9. With reference to your "main product", are the
relationships with your customers mostly of a long-term
nature (i.e. longer than 1 year)  or occasional?
(please tick only 1 answer for each type of customer)
•  Other firms (including those belonging to the
retail sector):
i) Long-term  ………………………………
ii) Occasional…..…………………………..
•  Consumers (only for firms which sell their
products directly to the public):
iii) Long-term  ….………………………………
iv) Occasional  …………………………………
A10. With reference to your "main product" and moving from a
normal level of production, how do your unit variable costs
(costs of labour and of other inputs) change when there is an
increase in the level of production?
(please tick only 1 answer)
•  Large  increase…..……………………………….
•  Moderate  increase...……….…………………….
•  Unchanged….  ….…..……………………………
•  Moderate  decrease………….…………………..
•  Large  decrease  …..…..………………………….
****
SECTION B - THE DETERMINANTS OF THE PRICE LEVEL
B1. The actual price of your "main product" is:
(please tick at most 2 answers)
•   The same for all customers……..…………….
•   Differentiated according to the quantity which is
sold …. ………..
•   Decided case by case …………………………
•   I do not know, I do not want to answer ..…….
B2. How do you normally set the price of your "main
product"?
•   A mark-up is applied to unit variable costs (cost
of labour and cost of the other
inputs)……………………………………………….
•   The price is regulated…... ……………………..
•   Other (please specify) …………………………
    ____________________________________
•   I do not know, I do not want to answer …...….42
B3. How different would the price of your "main product" be
if you did not have any competitor on your market?
•  Unchanged………………………………………
•  Slightly  different…..……………………………..
•  Fairly  different…….……………………………
•   Very different …………………………………..
B4. If you decided to increase the price of your "main
product" by 10%, ceteris paribus (in particular assuming
that the prices set by your competitors remain unchanged)
by what percentage would the demand for your "main
product" fall?
   |_|_|_|%
    I do not know
****
SECTION C - PRICE ADJUSTMENTS
C.1 Under normal conditions the price of your "main
product" is reviewed (without necessarily being changed):
In response to "specific events "
Periodically
•   Changes in costs …………………………….
•   Changes in demand………………………….
•   Other (please specify)………………………..
___________________________________
•  Daily  ………………………..………………..
•  Weekly  ……………….………………….…..
•  Monthly  ………………………………………
•  Quarterly  …..……………….………….…….
•  Yearly…………………………………….…..
C.2 Once you have decided that it is necessary to change the price of your “main product”, which of the factors listed below
might lead to a delay in the actual price change?
(please attribute the degree of importance to each answer by choosing one of the following four options:
1 = unimportant;        2 = of minor importance;         3 = important;             4 = very important)
C2.1 The fear that competing firms will not adjust their price……….. ………………………………………………
C2.2 The fear that subsequently you will need to modify the price in the opposite direction……………………..
C2.3 The presence of a contract which states conditions (including price) that can be changed only when the
contract is re-negotiated……………………………………………………………………………………………………….
C2.4 The price is set at “attractive" thresholds (e.g. 4.99 euro instead of 5.00) and it is changed only when it is
convenient to move to a new attractive threshold…………………………………… …………………………………….
C2.5 The presence of high costs of changing prices (printing new catalogues, physical costs of adjusting price
tags, etc)……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
C2.6 Bureaucratic rigidities (e.g., the need to inform trade associations of the new price) …………………..
C2.7 Other (please specify if possible) ……………………………………………………………………………..43
C.3 Is it possible that the price of your "main product" is below your unit variable costs?
Yes….
No…
C.4 If the answer to the previous question is "yes", for how many months would you be willing to accept a
price level below unit variable costs?
_Months
 I do not
know
C.5 In 2001 how many times did you actually change the price of your "main product"? |__| times
 I do not
know
C.6 And in 2002? |__| times
 I do not
know
****
SECTION D – THE ASYMMETRIES
D.1 Which factors would be likely to cause an increase in
the price of your "main product"?
(please attribute the degree of importance to each answer
by choosing one of the following four options:
1 = unimportant;        2 = of minor importance;
3 = important;             4 = very important)
•   An increase in the cost of labour …………..….…
•   An increase in the cost of raw materials…………
•   An increase in financial costs ...…………..…….
•   A rise in demand…………………..…………….…
•   Price increase by one or more competitors…….
•   Other (please specify)..……………………………
______________________________________
D.2 If demand for your "main product" increased, before
you had raised the price level, would you first consider:
•   An extension in delivery time
Yes….
No…
•   Changing the level of stocks
Yes….
No…
D.3 Which factors would be likely to cause a decrease in
the price of your "main product"?
(please attribute the degree of importance to each answer
by choosing one of the following four options:
1 = unimportant;        2 = of minor importance;
3 = important;             4 = very important)
•   A decrease in the cost of labour …………….……
•   A decrease in the cost of raw materials… ………
•   A decrease in financial costs …………..……….
•   A decrease in demand………………………….…
•   Price decrease by one or more competitors…….
•   Other (please specify)..…………………………...
______________________________________
D.4 If you were about to decrease the price of your “main product”, would you fear that customers might assume
that you had reduced its quality?
(please tick only 1 answer)                                                                                                                           Yes….
No…
I do not know…Appendix B – The survey: some details
The survey was carried out by a private firm (Questlab S.r.l.) from 30 January to 26
March 2003. The initial sample provided by the Bank of Italy was composed of 729 firms,
which were extracted from the list of firms used by the Bank for the quarterly survey of
inflation expectations. The sample was stratified according to firm size and geographical
area, as described in Table B1.
Table B1 - The sample
Population Respondents Weights
Stratum
North-west, < 199 employees 6409 37 3.80
North-west, 200-999 employees 1434 67 0.47
North-west,  > 999 employees 229 27 0.19
North-east, < 199 employees 3500 35 2.20
North-east, 200-999 employees 546 38 0.32
North-east,  > 999 employees 69 14 0.11
Centre, < 199 employees 2125 19 2.46
Centre, 200-999 employees 424 30 0.31
Centre,  > 999 employees 77 12 0.14
South-islands, < 199 employees 1620 22 1.62
South-islands, 200-999 employees 271 28 0.21
South-islands, > 999 employees 34 4 0.19
Total 16745 333 1
Most companies (89 per cent of the initial sample) were contacted by e-mail (the rest
by fax; Table B2); on that occasion firms received a login and a password to compile the
questionnaire directly on a web-site (www.questlab.it). The firms that did not have an e-mail
address were contacted by fax. A “call centre” was available to firms requiring additional
information on how to complete the questionnaire. Firms were also contacted by telephone
to make sure they would participate in the survey.
Table B2 – Actions
Total Average for firm (1)
E-mails sent 2113 3.2
Faxes sent 127 1.6
Phone-calls 2927 4.0
Notes: 
(1) Computed with reference to the initial number of firms (729).45




Not suitable for this type of questionnaire 46 6.2
Not available to provide an answer now, but willing
to do so in the future
132 18.1
Explicit refusal 21 2.9
Firms that did not answer at all 197 27.0
Firms contacted 729 100.0
A few weeks before the start of the survey, the questionnaire was pre-tested on a pilot
sample of around 20 firms. This step provided useful indications on how to carry out the
survey and how to adjust a few questions.
The number of firms that agreed to complete the questionnaire was 333, 45.7 per cent
of the initial sample. This response rate is not high, but it can be considered acceptable for
such a complex survey. Analysing the characteristics of the firms that agreed to participate,
we note that the questionnaire was better suited  for manufacturing firms, particularly those
operating in the food and energy sectors (for these sectors the response rate increases to
around 50 per cent); by contrast, the questionnaire was not so suitable for companies in the
service sector. We believe that the main reason is that it was less easy for these firms to
identify their main product and define the pricing strategy related to it. The response rate
decreases to around 40 per cent for firms operating in retail and services. On the basis of the
comments sent by firms which chose not to participate in the survey and the questions that
were raised, we noticed that compiling the questionnaire caused some difficulties in the
following cases:
  Retail firms: difficulties identifying  the main product. It would have been better to refer
to categories of products;
  Service firms: difficulties identifying the main service;
  Firms producing several goods, which had difficulty identifying the main product on the
basis of turnover;
  Firms with one customer, which do not have their own pricing strategy;
  Branches of foreign firms, which do not have their own pricing strategy;
  Firms subject to price controls (example: water, gas and electricity), which do not have
their own autonomous pricing strategy;46
  Firms selling their products/services by public tender: the rules followed to fix prices are
different from market pricing strategies.
Not all the above situations were considered in detail when the sample was
constructed. The consequences were:
  Large self-selection by firms, confirmed by the number of firms that were “not suitable”
(46 events/cases) or “not available” for this questionnaire (132 events/cases; Table B3).
This last figure is higher than in other surveys.
  Some firms answered only partially.
To avoid these problems it would have been better to add an initial section on the
firm’s activity to check whether it had its own pricing strategy. On the basis of this
assessment, the firm could then have decided whether or not to fill in the questionnaire.
Treatment of missing answers
Since the questionnaires proposed via web and via fax have the same characteristics,
no automatic filter was inserted for compilation.
If all the answers to one question were blank or the answer presented some degree of
uncertainty, the respondents were contacted by telephone, but if only one answer was
missing no action was taken. In general, few corrections were made ex post because usually
the respondents occupied a high position in their firms.Appendix C – Significance tests of sectoral differences
The following tables report results of tests for the significance of pairwise sectoral
differences. The figures contained in the tables are the p-values related to the null hypothesis
H0: sectoral differences are not significant (those outlined in bold are rejections).
The tests were performed by regressing the dependent variable on five sectoral
dummies (without constant) and subsequently testing, on a pairwise basis, the hypothesis of
equality of the coefficients of such dummies.
Table C3 - What is the most important market (in terms of turnover) for your “main product”?
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.02
Retail - 0.09 0.82 0.11
Other services - 1.00 0.54
Construction -1 . 0 0
Food -
Table C4 – On the domestic market your firm is:
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.29
Retail - 0.01 0.00 0.18
Other services - 0.00 0.40
Construction -0 . 0 0
Food -
Table C5 – On the domestic market, could you indicate the number of your competitors?
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.00 0.34 1.00 0.00
Retail - 0.00 1.00 0.04
Other services - 1.00 0.00
Construction -1 . 0 0
Food -
Table C6 – Relationships with firms:
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.49
Retail - 0.45 0.00 0.21
Other services - 0.00 0.38
Construction - 0.00
Food -
Table C6 – Relationships with consumers:
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl. Food - 0.55 0.65 n.a. 0.09
Retail - 0.32 n.a. 0.12
Other services - n.a. 0.07
Construction -
Food -
Table C7 – How do your unit variable costs change when there is an increase in the level of
production?
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.00 0.02 0.95 0.24
Retail - 0.11 0.56 0.00
Other services - 0.37 0.01
Construction -0 . 9 8
Food -48
Table C8 – The price of your “main product” is:
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Retail - 0.00 0.00 0.05
Other services - 0.00 0.03
Construction - 0.00
Food -
Table C9 – How do you normally set the price of your “main product”?
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.00 0.07 1.00 0.05
Retail - 0.17 1.00 0.07
Other services - 1.00 0.18
Construction -1 . 0 0
Food -
Table C10 – How different would the price of your “main product” be if you did not have any
competitor on your market?
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.13
Retail - 0.41 0.00 0.20
Other services - 0.00 0.03
Construction - 0.00
Food -
Table C11 – By what percentage would the demand for your main product fall if you increased its
price by 10%?
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.55 0.13 0.11 0.33
Retail - 0.10 0.08 0.23
Other services - 0.33 0.75
Construction -0 . 2 6
Food -
Table C12 – Under normal conditions, the price of your "main product” is reviewed:
In response to “specific events”
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.00 0.31 0.02 0.53
Retail - 0.14 0.12 0.21




Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.74 0.05 1.00 0.00
Retail - 0.26 1.00 0.14
Other services - 1.00 0.49
Construction - 0.00
Food -
Table C13 – How many times did you actually change the price of your “main product” in 2002?
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.97 0.45 0.98 0.18
Retail - 0.57 0.97 0.27
Other services - 0.82 0.10
Construction -0 . 1 3
Food -49
Table C14 – Is it possible that the price of your “main product” is below your unit variable costs?
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.34 0.00 0.56 0.08
Retail - 0.10 0.44 0.48
Other services - 0.26 0.43
Construction -0 . 3 5
Food -
Table C16 – Which of the factors listed below might lead to a delay in the actual price change?
The fear that competing firms will not adjust their selling price
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.70 0.05 0.33 n.a.
Retail - 0.06 0.42 n.a.
Other services - 0.11 n.a.
Construction -n . a .
Food -
The fear that subsequently you will need to modify the price in the opposite direction
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.44 0.65 0.22 n.a.
Retail - 0.33 0.19 n.a.
Other services - 0.25 n.a.
Construction -n . a .
Food -
The presence of a contract which states conditions that can be changed only when the contract is re-negotiated
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.00 0.01 n.a. 0.37
Retail - 0.00 n.a. 0.00
Other services - n.a. 0.25
Construction -n . a .
Food -
The price is set at “attractive” threshold and it is changed only when it is convenient to move to a new one
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.00 0.62 0.50 n.a.
Retail - 0.00 0.35 n.a.
Other services - 0.63 n.a.
Construction -n . a .
Food -
The presence of high costs of changing prices contract is re-negotiated
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.08 0.66 n.a. 0.21
Retail - 0.29 n.a. 0.74
Other services - n.a. 0.49
Construction -n . a .
Food -
Bureaucratic rigidities
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.07 0.31 n.a. 0.00
Retail - 0.03 n.a. 0.28
Other services - n.a. 0.00
Construction -n . a .
Food -50
Table C18 – If demand for “your main product” increased, before you raise the price the price level,
would you first consider
An extension in delivery time
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.95 0.03 1.00 0.11
Retail - 0.07 1.00 0.19
Other services - 1.00 0.66
Construction -1 . 0 0
Food -
Changing the level of stocks
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl. Food - 0.74 0.00 0.28 0.40
Retail - 0.00 0.27 0.67
Other services - 0.10 0.01
Construction -0 . 2 4
Food -
Table C19 – If you were about to decrease the price of your “main product”, would you fear that
customers might assume that you had reduced its quality?
Manufacturing Retail Other services Construction Food
Manufacturing excl.food - 0.32 0.24 0.03 0.01
Retail - 0.11 0.01 0.01
Other services - 0.11 0.23
Construction -0 . 3 0
Food -Appendix D – Variables used in the econometric exercise
Dependent variables
Pud = 1     if an increase in demand has an impact on price that is either “important” or “very important”
= 0     elsewhere
Pld = 1    if a decrease in demand has an impact on price that is either “important” or “very important”
= 0    elsewhere
Puc = 1   if an increase in costs (cost of labour and cost of  raw materials) has an impact on price that
is either “important” or “very important”
= 0    elsewhere
Plc = 1    if a decrease in costs (cost of labour and cost of  raw materials) has an impact on price that
is either “important” or “very important”
= 0     elsewhere
Independent variables
Foreign market
Exp_share = 1     if the firm’s percentage turnover due to exports is > 40% (question A5)
= 0     elsewhere
Ext_mkt = 1    if the foreign market is the most important for the firm (question A4)
= 0    elsewhere
Competitive pressure
Mkt_shr 4 dummies that capture whether the firm, on the domestic market, is the first, one of the
first 4, one of the first 10, not among the first 10 firms (question A6).
Rivals 4 dummies which capture the reported number of the firm’s competitors: none, less than 5,
between 5 and 20, more than 20 (question A7).
Comp_press dummy equal to 1 if the firm reports that its price would be rather different or very different
if there were no competitors on its market (question B3), 0 otherwise
Relationships with customers
Customer = 1    if more than 60% of turnover generated by the main product is sold to other firms (question
A8)
= 0     elsewhere
Price_discr = 1    if the price is the same for all customers (question B1)
= 0     elsewhere
Price_reg = 1    if the price is regulated (question B2)
= 0     elsewhere
Marginal costs
MC = 1    if marginal costs are constant (question A10)
= 0     elsewhere
Control variables
Area          4 dummies that capture whether the firm is located in the North-west (North-west), in the
North-east (North-east), in Centre (Centre) or in the South (South).
Size          3 dummies that capture whether the firm has up to 199 employees, between 200 and 999
employees, or more than 999 employees.
Sector          5 dummies that capture whether the firm’s activity is classified as manufacturing, retail,
other services, food or construction industry.References
Apel, M., Friberg, R. and K. Hallsten (2001), “Micro Foundations of Price Adjustment:
Survey Evidence from Swedish Firms”, Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper, No. 128.
Aucremanne, L., G. Brys, M. Hubert, P.J. Rousseeuw and A. Struyf (2002), “Inflation,
Relative Prices and Nominal Rigidities”, National Bank of Belgium Working Paper.
Ball, L. and D. Romer (1990), “Real Rigidities and the Non-Neutrality of Money”, Review of
Economic Studies, Vol. 57, pp. 183-203.
Bils, M. and P.J. Klenow (2002), “Some Evidence of the Importance of Sticky Prices”,
NBER Working Paper No. 9069.
Blinder, A. (1991), “What Makes Prices Sticky? Preliminary Results from an Interview
Study”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 81(2), pp. 89-96.
Blinder, A. (1994), “On Sticky Prices: Academic Theories Meet the Real World”, in
Mankiw, N. G. (ed.) Monetary Policy, Chicago and London, The University of
Chicago Press.
Blinder, A., E. Canetti, D. Lebow and J. Rudd (1998), Asking about Prices: A New
Approach to Understand Price Stickiness, New York, Russel Sage Foundation.
Buckle, R.A. and J.A. Carlson (1996), “Price Duration with Two-Sided Pricing Rules”, in
K.H. Oppenlander and G. Poser (eds.), Business Cycle Surveys: Forecasting Issues
and Methodological Aspects.  Selected papers presented at the 22nd CIRET
Conference, Singapore 1995, Avebury, Aldershot.
Carlton, D. W. (1986), “The Rigidity of Prices”, American Economic Review, Vol. 76(4), pp.
637-58.
Cecchetti, S.G. (1986), “The Frequency of Price Adjustment: A Study of Newsstand Prices
of Magazines”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 31, pp. 255-74.
Fabiani, S., A. Gattulli and R. Sabbatini (2003), “Price Stickiness in Italy”, mimeo, Bank of
Italy.
Hall, R. (1986), “Market Structure and Macroeconomic Fluctuations”, Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, No.2, pp. 285-322.
Hall, S., M. Walsh and A. Yates (1997), “How Do UK Companies Set Prices”, Bank of
England Working Paper.
Hall, S. and A. Yates (1998),  “Are there Downward Nominal Rigidities in Product
Markets?”, Bank of England Working Paper, No. 80.
Hall, S., A. Yates and M. Walsh (2000), “Are UK Companies’ Prices Sticky?”, Oxford
Economic Papers, Vol. 52(3), pp. 425-46.
Kashyap (1995), “Sticky Prices: New Evidence from Retail Catalogs”, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 110(2), pp. 245-74.53
Koehler, A. (1996), “Price Rigidity in New Keynesian Models: First Results from an
Empirical Analysis”, in K.H. Oppenlander and G. Poser (eds.), Business Cycle
Surveys: Forecasting Issues and Methodological Aspects. Selected papers presented at
the 22nd CIRET Conference, Singapore 1995, Avebury, Aldershot.
Maddala, G.S. (1983), Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Marchetti, D.J. and F. Nucci (2002), “Pricing Behavior and the Comovement of Productivity
and Labor: Evidence from Firm-Level Data”, Bank of Italy, mimeo, April.
Martin, C. (1993), “Price Adjustment and Market Structure”, Economics Letters, Vol. 41(2),
pp. 139-43.
Mostacci, F. and R. Sabbatini (2003), “L’euro ha creato inflazione? Changeover e
arrotondamenti dei prezzi al consumo in Italia nel 2002”, Moneta e Credito, Vol. 221,
pp. 45-95.
Okun, A. (1981), Prices and Quantities: a Macroeconomic Analysis, Brookings Institute,
Washington DC.
Rotemberg, J. and G. Saloner (1997), “The Relative Rigidity of Monopoly Pricing”,
American Economic Review, Vol. 77(5), pp. 917-26.
Small, I. and T. Yates (1999), “What Makes Prices Sticky? Some Survey Evidence for the
United Kingdom”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin.
Suvanto, A. and J. Hukkinen (2002), “Stable Price Level and Changing Prices”, mimeo,
Bank of Finland.
Taylor, J.B. (1999), “Staggered Price and Wage Setting in Macroeconomics”, in Taylor, J.P.
and M. Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1b, North-Holland.
Yates, A. (1998), “Downward Nominal Rigidity and Monetary Policy”, Bank of England
Working Paper.RECENTLY PUBLISHED “TEMI” (*)
N.  488  –  Pitfalls of monetary policy under incomplete information: imprecise indicators and 
real indeterminacy, by E. GAIOTTI (March 2004).
N.   489  –  Information technology and productivity changes in the banking industry, by 
L. CASOLARO and G. GOBBI (March 2004).
N.   490  –  La bilancia dei pagamenti di parte corrente Nord-Sud (1998-2000), by L. CANNARI 
and S. CHIRI (March 2004).
N.  491  –  Investire in Italia? Risultati di una recente indagine empirica, by M. COMMITTERI 
(March 2004).
N.  492  –  Centralization  of  wage  bargaining  and  the  unemployment  rate:  revisiting  the 
hump-shape hypothesis, by L. FORNI (June 2004).
N.  493  –   Endogenous monetary policy with unobserved potential output, by A. CUKIERMAN 
and F. LIPPI (June 2004).
N.  494  –  Il credito commerciale: problemi e teorie, by M. OMICCIOLI (June 2004).
N.  495  –  Condizioni di credito commerciale e differenziazione della clientela,byL. CANNARI, 
S. CHIRI aND M. OMICCIOLI (June 2004).
N.  496  –  Il debito commerciale in Italia: quanto contano le motivazioni finanziarie?, by
P. FINALDI RUSSO and L. LEVA (June 2004).
N.  497  –  Funzionamento della giustizia civile e struttura finanziaria delle imprese: il ruolo 
del credito commerciale, by A. CARMIGNANI (June 2004).
N.  498  –  Does trade credit substitute for bank credit?, by G. DE BLASIO (June 2004).
N.  499  –  Monetary policy and the transition to rational expectations, by G. FERRERO (June 
2004).
N.  500  –  Turning-point indicators from business surveys: real-time detection for the euro 
area and its major member countries, by A. BAFFIGI and A. BASSANETTI (June 
2004).
N.  501  –  La ricchezza delle famiglie italiane e americane, by I. FAIELLA and A. NERI (June 
2004).
N.  502  –  Optimal duplication of effort in advocacy systems, by G. PALUMBO (June 2004).
N.  503  –  Il  pilastro  privato  del  sistema  previdenziale.  Il  caso  del  Regno  Unito,  by
F. SPADAFORA (June 2004).
N.  504  –  Firm  size  distribution  and  employment  protection  legislation  in  Italy,  by
F. SCHIVARDI and R. TORRINI (June 2004).
N.   505  –  Social mobility and endogenous cycles in redistribution, by F. ZOLLINO (July 2004).
N.   506  –  Estimating expectations of shocks using option prices, by A. DI CESARE (July 2004).
N.   507  –  Estimating state price densities by Hermite polynomials: theory and application to 
the Italian derivatives market, by P. GUASONI (July 2004).
N.   508  –  The interaction between face-to-face and electronic delivery: the case of the Italian 
banking industry, by E. BONACCORSI DI PATTI, G. GOBBI and P. E. MISTRULLI (July 
2004).
N.   509  –  Bad loans and entry into local credit markets, by M. BOFONDI and G. GOBBI (July 
2004).
N.   510  –  Does wealth affect consumption? Evidence for Italy, by M. PAIELLA (July 2004).
N.   511  –  Information variables for monetary policy in a small structural model of the euro 
area, by F. LIPPI and S. NERI (July 2004).
N.   512  –  Monetary union with voluntary participation, by W. FUCHS and F. LIPPI (July 2004).
N.   513  –  Monetary policy and stock prices: theory and evidence, by S. NERI (July 2004).
N.   514  –  Financial structure and the transmission of monetary shocks: preliminary evidence 
for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, by A. ANZUINI and A. LEVY (July 
2004).
(*)  Requests for copies should be sent to:
Banca d’Italia – Servizio Studi – Divisione Biblioteca e pubblicazioni – Via Nazionale, 91 – 00184 Rome
(fax 0039 06 47922059). They area available on the Internet www.bancaditalia.it."TEMI" LATER PUBLISHED ELSEWHERE
1999
L. GUISO and G. PARIGI, Investment and demand uncertainty, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114
(1), pp. 185-228, TD No. 289 (November 1996).
A. F. POZZOLO,  Gli effetti della liberalizzazione valutaria sulle transazioni finanziarie dell’Italia con
l’estero, Rivista di Politica Economica, Vol. 89 (3), pp. 45-76, TD No. 296 (February 1997).
A. CUKIERMAN and F. LIPPI, Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and
unemployment: theory and evidence, European Economic Review, Vol. 43 (7), pp. 1395-1434, TD
No. 332 (April 1998).
P. CASELLI and R. RINALDI, La politica fiscale nei paesi dell’Unione europea negli anni novanta, Studi e
note di economia, (1), pp. 71-109, TD No. 334 (July 1998).
A. BRANDOLINI, The distribution of personal income in post-war Italy: Source description, data quality,
and the time pattern of income inequality, Giornale degli economisti e Annali di economia, Vol. 58
(2), pp. 183-239, TD No. 350 (April 1999).
L. GUISO, A. K. KASHYAP, F. PANETTA and D. TERLIZZESE, Will a common European monetary policy
have asymmetric effects?, Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Vol. 23 (4),
pp. 56-75, TD No. 384 (October 2000).
2000
P. ANGELINI, Are banks risk-averse? Timing of the operations in the interbank market, Journal of  Money,
Credit and Banking, Vol. 32 (1), pp. 54-73, TD No. 266 (April 1996).
F. DRUDI and R: GIORDANO, Default Risk and optimal debt management, Journal of Banking and Finance,
Vol. 24 (6), pp. 861-892, TD No. 278 (September 1996).
F. DRUDI and R. GIORDANO,  Wage indexation, employment and inflation, Scandinavian Journal of
Economics, Vol. 102 (4), pp. 645-668, TD No. 292 (December 1996).
F. DRUDI and A. PRATI, Signaling fiscal regime sustainability, European Economic Review, Vol. 44 (10),
pp. 1897-1930, TD No. 335 (September 1998).
F. FORNARI and R. VIOLI, The probability density function of interest rates implied in the price of options,
in: R. Violi, (ed.) , Mercati dei derivati, controllo monetario e stabilità finanziaria, Il Mulino,
Bologna, TD No. 339 (October 1998).
D. J. MARCHETTI and G. PARIGI,  Energy consumption, survey data and the prediction of industrial
production in Italy, Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 19 (5), pp. 419-440, TD No. 342 (December
1998).
A. BAFFIGI, M. PAGNINI and F. QUINTILIANI, Localismo bancario e distretti industriali: assetto dei mercati
del credito e finanziamento degli investimenti, in: L.F. Signorini (ed.), Lo sviluppo locale:
un'indagine della Banca d'Italia sui distretti industriali, Donzelli, TD No. 347 (March 1999).
A. SCALIA and V. VACCA, Does market transparency matter? A case study, in: Market Liquidity: Research
Findings and Selected Policy Implications, Basel, Bank for International Settlements, TD No. 359
(October 1999).
F. SCHIVARDI, Rigidità nel mercato del lavoro, disoccupazione e crescita, Giornale degli economisti e
Annali di economia, Vol. 59 (1), pp. 117-143, TD No. 364 (December 1999).
G. BODO, R. GOLINELLI and G. PARIGI, Forecasting industrial production in the euro area, Empirical
Economics, Vol. 25 (4), pp. 541-561, TD No. 370 (March 2000).
F. ALTISSIMO, D. J. MARCHETTI and G. P. ONETO, The Italian business cycle: Coincident and leading
indicators and some stylized facts, Giornale degli economisti e Annali di economia, Vol. 60 (2), pp.
147-220, TD No. 377 (October 2000).
C. MICHELACCI and P. ZAFFARONI, (Fractional) Beta convergence, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol.
45, pp. 129-153, TD No. 383 (October 2000).R. DE BONIS and A. FERRANDO, The Italian banking structure in the nineties: testing the multimarket
contact hypothesis, Economic Notes, Vol. 29 (2), pp. 215-241, TD No. 387 (October 2000).
2001
M. CARUSO, Stock prices and money velocity: A multi-country analysis, Empirical Economics, Vol. 26
(4), pp. 651-72, TD No. 264 (February 1996).
P. CIPOLLONE and D. J. MARCHETTI, Bottlenecks and limits to growth: A multisectoral analysis of Italian
industry, Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 23 (6), pp. 601-620, TD No. 314 (August 1997).
P. CASELLI, Fiscal consolidations under fixed exchange rates, European Economic Review, Vol. 45 (3),
pp. 425-450, TD No. 336 (October 1998).
F. ALTISSIMO and G. L. VIOLANTE, Nonlinear VAR: Some theory and an application to US GNP and
unemployment, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 16 (4), pp. 461-486, TD No. 338 (October
1998).
F. NUCCI and A. F. POZZOLO, Investment and the exchange rate, European Economic Review, Vol. 45 (2),
pp. 259-283, TD No. 344 (December 1998).
L. GAMBACORTA, On the institutional design of the European monetary union: Conservatism, stability
pact and economic shocks, Economic Notes, Vol. 30 (1), pp. 109-143, TD No. 356 (June 1999).
P. FINALDI RUSSO and P. ROSSI, Credit costraints in italian industrial districts, Applied Economics, Vol.
33 (11), pp. 1469-1477, TD No. 360 (December 1999).
A. CUKIERMAN and F. LIPPI, Labor markets and monetary union: A strategic analysis, Economic Journal,
Vol. 111 (473), pp. 541-565, TD No. 365 (February 2000).
G. PARIGI and S. SIVIERO, An investment-function-based measure of capacity utilisation, potential output
and utilised capacity in the Bank of Italy’s quarterly model, Economic Modelling, Vol. 18 (4), pp.
525-550, TD No. 367 (February 2000).
F. BALASSONE and D. MONACELLI,  Emu fiscal rules: Is there a gap?, in: M. Bordignon and D. Da Empoli
(eds.), Politica fiscale, flessibilità dei mercati e crescita, Milano, Franco Angeli, TD No. 375 (July
2000).
A. B. ATKINSON and A. BRANDOLINI, Promise and pitfalls in the use of “secondary" data-sets: Income
inequality in OECD countries, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39 (3), pp. 771-799, TD No.
379 (October 2000).
D. FOCARELLI and A. F. POZZOLO, The determinants of cross-border bank shareholdings: An analysis with
bank-level data from OECD countries, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 25 (12), pp. 2305-
2337, TD No. 381 (October 2000).
M. SBRACIA and A. ZAGHINI, Expectations and information in second generation currency crises models,
Economic Modelling, Vol. 18 (2), pp. 203-222, TD No. 391 (December 2000).
F. FORNARI and A. MELE, Recovering the probability density function of asset prices using GARCH as
diffusion approximations, Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 8 (1), pp. 83-110, TD No. 396
(February 2001).
P. CIPOLLONE, La convergenza dei salari manifatturieri in Europa, Politica economica, Vol. 17 (1), pp.
97-125, TD No. 398 (February 2001).
E. BONACCORSI  DI  PATTI and G. GOBBI,  The changing structure of local credit markets: Are small
businesses special?, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 25 (12), pp. 2209-2237, TD No. 404
(June 2001).
G. MESSINA,  Decentramento fiscale e perequazione regionale. Efficienza e redistribuzione nel nuovo
sistema di finanziamento delle regioni a statuto ordinario, Studi economici, Vol. 56 (73), pp. 131-
148, TD No. 416 (August 2001).2002
R. CESARI and F. PANETTA, Style, fees and performance of Italian equity funds, Journal of Banking and
Finance, Vol. 26 (1), TD No. 325 (January 1998).
L. GAMBACORTA, Asymmetric bank lending channels and ECB monetary policy, Economic Modelling,
Vol. 20 (1), pp. 25-46, TD No. 340 (October 1998).
C. GIANNINI, “Enemy of none but a common friend of all”? An international perspective on the lender-of-
last-resort function, Essay in International Finance, Vol. 214, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University
Press, TD No. 341 (December 1998).
A. ZAGHINI, Fiscal adjustments and economic performing: A comparative study, Applied Economics, Vol.
33 (5), pp. 613-624, TD No. 355 (June 1999).
F. ALTISSIMO, S. SIVIERO and D. TERLIZZESE, How deep are the deep parameters?, Annales d’Economie et
de Statistique,.(67/68), pp. 207-226, TD No. 354 (June 1999).
F. FORNARI, C. MONTICELLI, M. PERICOLI and M. TIVEGNA, The impact of news on the exchange rate of
the lira and long-term interest rates, Economic Modelling, Vol. 19 (4), pp. 611-639, TD No. 358
(October 1999).
D. FOCARELLI, F. PANETTA and C. SALLEO, Why do banks merge?, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Vol. 34 (4), pp. 1047-1066, TD No. 361 (December 1999).
D. J. MARCHETTI, Markup and the business cycle: Evidence from Italian manufacturing branches, Open
Economies Review, Vol. 13 (1), pp. 87-103, TD No. 362 (December 1999).
F. BUSETTI, Testing for stochastic trends in series with structural breaks, Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 21
(2), pp. 81-105, TD No. 385 (October 2000).
F. LIPPI, Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker, European Economic Review, Vol. 46 (3), pp.
601-612, TD No. 386 (October 2000).
F. PANETTA, The stability of the relation between the stock market and macroeconomic forces, Economic
Notes, Vol. 31 (3), TD No. 393 (February 2001).
G. GRANDE and L. VENTURA, Labor income and risky assets under market incompleteness: Evidence from
Italian data, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 26 (2-3), pp. 597-620, TD No. 399 (March
2001).
A. BRANDOLINI, P. CIPOLLONE and P. SESTITO, Earnings dispersion, low pay and household poverty in
Italy, 1977-1998, in D. Cohen, T. Piketty and G. Saint-Paul (eds.), The Economics of Rising
Inequalities, pp. 225-264, Oxford, Oxford University Press, TD No. 427 (November 2001).
L. CANNARI and G. D’ALESSIO, La distribuzione del reddito e della ricchezza nelle regioni italiane, Rivista
Economica del Mezzogiorno (Trimestrale della SVIMEZ), Vol. XVI(4), pp. 809-847, Il Mulino,
TD No. 482 (June 2003).
2003
F. SCHIVARDI, Reallocation and learning over the business cycle, European Economic Review, , Vol. 47
(1), pp. 95-111, TD No.  345 (December 1998).
P. CASELLI, P. PAGANO and F. SCHIVARDI, Uncertainty and slowdown of capital accumulation in Europe,
Applied Economics, Vol. 35 (1), pp. 79-89, TD No.  372 (March 2000).
P. PAGANO and G. FERRAGUTO, Endogenous growth with intertemporally dependent preferences,
Contribution to Macroeconomics, Vol. 3 (1), pp. 1-38, TD No.  382 (October 2000).
P. PAGANO and F. SCHIVARDI, Firm size distribution and growth, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol.
105(2), pp. 255-274, TD No.  394 (February 2001).
M. PERICOLI and M. SBRACIA, A Primer on Financial Contagion, Journal of Economic Surveys, TD No.
407 (June 2001).
M. SBRACIA and A. ZAGHINI, The role of the banking system in the international transmission of shocks,
World Economy, TD No. 409 (June 2001).E. GAIOTTI and A. GENERALE, Does monetary policy have asymmetric effects? A look at the investment
decisions of Italian firms, Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, Vol. 61 (1), pp. 29-59,
TD No. 429 (December 2001).
L. GAMBACORTA, The Italian banking system and monetary policy transmission: evidence from bank level
data, in: I. Angeloni, A. Kashyap and B. Mojon (eds.), Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro
Area, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, TD No. 430 (December 2001).
M. EHRMANN, L. GAMBACORTA, J. MARTÍNEZ PAGÉS, P. SEVESTRE and A. WORMS, Financial systems and
the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in the euro area, in: I. Angeloni, A. Kashyap and
B. Mojon (eds.), Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, TD No. 432 (December 2001).
F. SPADAFORA, Financial crises, moral hazard and the speciality of the international market: further
evidence from the pricing of syndicated bank loans to emerging markets, Emerging Markets
Review, Vol. 4 ( 2),  pp. 167-198, TD No. 438 (March 2002).
D. FOCARELLI and F. PANETTA, Are mergers beneficial to consumers? Evidence from the market for bank
deposits, American Economic Review, Vol. 93 (4), pp. 1152-1172, TD No. 448 (July 2002).
E.VIVIANO,  Un'analisi critica delle definizioni di disoccupazione e partecipazione in Italia, Politica
Economica, Vol. 19 (1), pp. 161-190, TD No. 450 (July 2002).
F. BUSETTI and A. M. ROBERT TAYLOR, Testing against stochastic trend and seasonality in the presence of
unattended breaks and unit roots, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 117 (1), pp. 21-53, TD No. 470
(February 2003).
2004
P. CHIADES and L. GAMBACORTA, The Bernanke and Blinder model in an open economy: The Italian case,
German Economic Review, Vol. 5 (1), pp. 1-34, TD No. 388 (December 2000).
M. PAIELLA, Heterogeneity in financial market participation: appraising its implications for the C-CAPM,
Review of Finance, Vol. 8, pp. 1-36, TD No. 473 (June 2003).
E. BONACCORSI DI PATTI and G. DELL’ARICCIA, Bank competition and firm creation, Journal of Money
Credit and Banking, Vol. 36 (2), pp. 225-251, TD No. 481 (June 2003).
R. GOLINELLI and G. PARIGI, Consumer sentiment and economic activity: a cross country comparison,
Journal of Business Cycle Measurement and Analysis, Vol. 1 (2), TD No. 484 (September 2003).
FORTHCOMING
A. F. POZZOLO, Research and development regional spillovers, and the localisation of economic activities,
The Manchester School, TD No. 331 (March 1998).
F. LIPPI, Strategic monetary policy with non-atomistic wage-setters, Review of Economic Studies, TD No.
374 (June 2000).
P. ANGELINI and N. CETORELLI, Bank competition and regulatory reform: The case of the Italian banking
industry, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, TD No. 380 (October 2000).
L. DEDOLA AND F. LIPPI, The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Evidence from the industry Data of Five
OECD Countries, European Economic Review, TD No. 389 (December 2000).
M. BUGAMELLI and P. PAGANO, Barriers to Investment in ICT, Applied Economics, TD No. 420 (October
2001).
D. J. MARCHETTI and  F. NUCCI, Price Stickiness and the Contractionary Effects of Technology Shocks,
European Economic Review, TD No. 392 (February 2001).
G. CORSETTI, M. PERICOLI and M. SBRACIA, Correlation analysis of financial contagion: what one should
know before running a test, Journal of International Money and Finance, TD No. 408 (June 2001).
D. FOCARELLI, Bootstrap bias-correction procedure in estimating long-run relationships from dynamicpanels, with an application to money demand in the euro area, Economic Modelling, TD No. 440
(March 2002).
A. BAFFIGI, R. GOLINELLI and G. PARIGI, Bridge models to forecast the euro area GDP, International
Journal of Forecasting, TD No. 456 (December 2002).
F. CINGANO and F. SCHIVARDI,  Identifying the sources of local productivity growth, Journal of the
European Economic Association, TD NO. 474 (June 2003).
E. BARUCCI, C. IMPENNA  and  R. RENÒ,  Monetary integration, markets and regulation, Research in
Banking and Finance, TD NO. 475 (June 2003).
G. ARDIZZI, Cost efficiency in the retail payment networks:first evidence from the Italian credit card
system, Rivista di Politica Economica, TD NO. 480 (June 2003).
L. GAMBACORTA and P. E. Mistrulli, Does bank capital affect lending behavior?, Journal of Financial
Intermediation, TD NO. 486 (September 2003).